



## moral foundations notes

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**Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria G. Dias, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?” from *The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1993, Vol 65, No 4, p. 613-628.**

613: “building cross-culturally valid models of moral judgment”

consensus around “all cultures moral issues involve questions of harm, rights, or justice.” cultural psychologists disagree “harmless yet offensive violations of strong social norms.”

harmless offenses in private and consensual are not considered legitimate or practical in the West.

614: Universality is seen as a “hallmark of moral judgment”

Shweder’s ethics:

autonomy - “the self is conceptualized as an individual preference structure, and the point of moral regulation is to increase choice, autonomy, and control.” - elaborated in Western secular societies

community - “the self is conceptualized as the holder of an office or role in a larger interdependent and collective enterprise. This code requires duty, respect, obedience to authority...”

divinity - “the self is conceptualized as a spiritual entity striving to avoid pollution and attain purity and sanctity. Acts that are disgusting or degrading to one’s spiritual nature are condemned.”

social practices are viewed as universal moral obligations whereas Americans would view them as social conventions.

616: “affluent social classes tend to be more individualistic”

625: “research across class lines should be given as much attention as research across national borders.”

“universalism without uniformity”

626: “emotions are cognitions invested with a motivation force.”

**Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment” from *Psychological Review*, 2001, Vol 108, No 4, 814-834.**

814: “moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions).

“what model of moral judgment allows a person to know that something is wrong without knowing why?”

“rationalist approaches in moral psychology, by extension, say that moral knowledge and moral judgment are reached primarily by a process of reasoning and reflection.”

“self-evident” truths are moral intuitions

“moral reasoning is usually an ex post facto process”

“when faced with a social demand for a verbal justification, one becomes a lawyer trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth.”

815: “reasoning is motivated” “post hoc justifications”

“we experience an illusion of objective reasoning”

“philosophers have frequently written about the conflict between reason and emotion as a conflict between divinity and animality.”

816: hume: “we attain moral knowledge by an ‘immediate feeling and finer internal sense,’ not by a ‘chain of argument and induction.’”

“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”

“kant’s rationalist ethical theory was created as an attempt to refute hume ... psychologists freed themselves from the worship of reason in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century ... views on morality were compatible with hume’s emphasis on emotions ... freud saw... judgments as driven by unconscious motives and feelings ... morality as acts that a society happens to reward or punish” (skinner)

Kohlberg’s cognitivism against “irrational emotive theories” emphasized development of morality

817: “affective reactions were good predictors of judgment, whereas perceptions of harmfulness were not.”

“morally dumbfounded” responses suggest morality can’t be wholly rational

818: “it must be stressed that the contrast of intuition and reasoning is not the contrast of emotion and cognition. Intuition, reasoning, and the appraisals contained in emotions are all forms of cognition. Rather, the words *intuition* and *reasoning* are intended to capture the contrast made by dozens of philosophers and psychologists between two kinds of cognition.”

819: “it is hypothesized that people rarely override their initial intuitive judgments just by reasoning privately to themselves because reasoning is rarely used to question one’s own attitudes or beliefs”

dual process – affective primacy theory, stronger, faster than rationality

“the emerging view in social cognition is that *most* of our behaviors and judgments are in fact made automatically.”

heuristic – principle of least effort due to limited cognitive resources

820: “standard moral judgment interviews may therefore create an unnaturally reasoned form of moral judgment, leading to the erroneous conclusion that moral judgment is primarily a reasoning process.”  
“philosophers have recognized that moral reasoning naturally occurs in a social setting”

“master and servant” relationship proposed by Hume

821: “people behave like ‘intuitive lawyers’ rather than ‘intuitive scientists’” “motivated reasoning”

823: “people think that they see the world as it is whereas their opponents in a moral dispute are biased by ideology and self-interest.”

824 – weak link between moral reasoning and action vs strong link between moral emotions and action

825: empathy-altruism hypothesis: “people are often motivated to help others and that the mechanisms involved in this helping are primarily affective, including empathy as well as reflexive distress, sadness, guilt, and shame.”

“artificially increasing the strength of a gut feeling increases the strength of the resulting moral judgment”

826: “social intuitionist model ... proposed that morality, like language, is a major evolutionary adaptation for an intensely social species, built into multiple regions of the brain and body, that is better described as emergent than as learned yet that requires input and shaping from a particular culture. Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and enculturated.”

Fiske’s four underlying models of social cognition are outlined here

828: morality is mostly learned through imitation and observation, not explicit instruction.

“moral development is primarily a matter of the maturation and cultural shaping of endogenous intuitions. People can acquire explicit propositional knowledge about right and wrong in adulthood, but it is primarily through participation in custom complexes involving sensory, motor, and other forms of implicit knowledge shared with one’s peers during the sensitive period of late childhood and adolescence that one comes to feel, physically and emotionally, the self-evident truth of moral propositions.

**Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph. “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues” from *Daedalus*, Vol. 133, No. 4, On Human Nature (Fall 2004), p. 55-66.**

55: empiricist morality - “there is no moral faculty or moral anything else built into the human mind”

nativist morality - “knowledge about [morality] has been built into the human mind by evolution.”

56: humans have intuitive ethics “innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving other human beings.”

suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity

60: modules are little bits of input-output programming, ways of enabling fast and automatic responses to specific environmental triggers.” they are heuristics, shortcuts, rules of thumb

proper domain “set of specific scenarios or stimuli that the module was evolved to handle.”  
(initial trigger)

actual domain “the set of all things in the world that now happen to trigger the module.”  
(current trigger)

61: “virtues are dynamic patternings of perception, emotion, judgment, and action.”  
“it sees morality as embodied in the very structure of the self, not merely as one of the activities of the self.”

62: “moral maturity is a matter of achieving a comprehensive attunement to the world, a set of highly sophisticated sensitivities embodied in the individual virtues.”

a move away from morality that focuses on deliberation and abstraction towards an way to act in the world

“we believe virtue theories are the most psychologically sound approach to morality.”

this essay hasn't differentiated loyalty from authority yet

64: “even if some virtues tend to go together across cultures, the virtue complexes that each culture generates are likely to be unique.

“morality is innate and socially constructed. It is cognitive and it is emotional.

**\*\*\*\* lays out four of the moralities**

**Haidt, Jonathan. “The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology.” in *Science*, New Series, Vol 316, No 5827 (May 18, 2007), p. 998-1002.**

synthesizing sciences – affective theory of cognition to moral theory to specific steps

998: “moral intuitions are socially functional, not truth-seeking”

selfish yet moral, universal yet culturally variable

OE wilson – new synthesis of sciences

kohlberg - “social experiences help children construct an increasingly adequate understanding of justice”

“kohlberg focused on conscious verbal reasoning”

“affective primacy”

“the human mind is composed of an ancient, automatic, and very fast affective system and a phylogenetically newer, slower, and motivationally weaker cognitive system. ... brains are always and automatically evaluating everything they perceive, and that higher-level human thinking is preceded, permeated, and influenced by affective reactions ... which push us gently (or not so gently) toward approach or avoidance.”

“language and the ability to engage in conscious moral reasoning came much later, perhaps only in the past 100 thousand years, so it is implausible that the neural mechanisms that control human judgment and behavior were suddenly rewired to hand control of the organism over to this new deliberative faculty.”

“moral intuition refers to fast, automatic, and (usually) affect-laden processes in which an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike appears in conscious without any awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral reasoning, in contrast, is a controlled and “cooler” (less affective) process; it is conscious mental activity that consists of transforming information about people and their actions in order to reach a moral judgment or decision”

“moral reasoning... is a post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction. “morally dumbfounded” they know something is wrong but they can’t explain why

999: “affective reactions push, but they do not absolutely force”

“we can use conscious verbal reasoning, such as considering the costs and benefit of each course of action. We can reframe a situation and see a new angle or consequence, thereby triggering a second flash of intuition that may compete with the first. and we can talk with people who raise new arguments, which then trigger in us new flashes of intuition followed by various kinds of reasoning. ... most moral change happens as a result of social interaction.”

“more reasoning is not like that of an idealized scientist or judge seeking the truth, which is often useful, rather, moral reasoning is like that of a lawyer or politician seeking whatever is useful, whether or not it is true.”

1000: we became capable of dispassionate reasoning only recently, and it occurs in a minority of cases, and works with affect, not free of it.

Care – kin selection  
justice – reciprocal altruism

“morality binds and builds ... creates groups that are emergent entities with new properties” - 1000

“the simple rules of darwinian evolution never change, but the complex game of life changes when radically new kinds of players take the field.”

group selection off limits for humans after 1966

1001: “Even if groups vary little or not at all genetically, groups that develop norms, practices, and institutions that elicit more group-beneficial behavior can grow, attract new members, and replace less cooperative groups.”

mirror neurons are greater in humans

inhibition of neocortical activity that leads to

loosening the boundaries of the self related to merging with god experiences in theory



the moral domain of westerners is narrower

**Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph, “The Moral Mind,” in *The Innate Mind*, Vol 3: Foundations and the Future (Jan 2008), p 367-392.**

classical moral virtues ==> enlightened philosophical rationalistic approaches ==> Kohlberg's development + care social conventions vs moral ==> 3 ethics, 4 interaction styles, 5-6 moralities

367: “students of morality are often biased to their own moral commitments.”

“psychologically study of morality, like psychology itself, has been dominated by politically liberal researchers.”

368: linking moral innateness with virtue theory - “emphasize practice and habit rather than propositional knowledge and reasoning”

as is said to be a pluralistic approach to aspects of the psyche as embodied and practices vs “dictating explicit rationale or principles” through “an overemphasis on deductive and calculative conceptions of value and rationality.”

369: the enlightenment challenged the underlying metaphysical commitments of classical virtue theories, such as gods and other supernatural forces.

“virtues to be cultivated through practice”

“the enlightenment project was an attempt to ground morality in high abstract, even logical, truths to disengage it from religious belief.”

formalist – Kant, prescriptive judgments, contractualist

consequentialist – utilitarian, focus on best outcomes

“formalism replaces substantive moral judgment with a logical rationality, whereas consequentialism replaces it with a calculative rationality.”

370: “both insist that moral decisions should be governed by reason and logic, not emotion and intuition. And both devalue the particular in favor of the abstract.”

this modern approach is “quandary ethics” - Edmund Pincoffs

“Whereas the Greeks focused on *character* and asked what kind of person we should each *become*, modern ethics focuses on *actions*, trying to determine which ones we should do.”

Kohlberg's highest stage of moral development: “at which all decisions are made by reference to the universally applicable, self-constructed, and nonconsequentialist principle of justice” Carol Gilligan offered care as an independent variable of morality.

371: “when the domain of morality is narrowed... overly parsimonious theories of moral psychology flourish.”

moral vs conventional judgments of right and wrong – inherently exclude collective concerns as conventional and not moral

“in most cultures the social order is a moral order ... the social order is a sacred order as well.”

372: “it is important to begin the explanation of moral functioning by observing the individual and cultural facts about moral functioning not with a stipulative definition of the moral domain inherited from moral philosophers.”

“the first step in mapping the moral domain of any culture, we believe, should therefore be to list and count the norms that get the most attention.”

373: “marcus uses the metaphor that genes create the *first draft* of the brain, and experience later *edits* it”

prewired – flexible, subject to change vs hardwired – fixed, immutable

374: “built in does not mean unmalleable; it means organized in advance of experience.”

constructivism and connectionism are blank slate theories that can describe the editing process of morality but not give reason for their rise

“children are active participants in their own development.”

“the child continually constructed and reconstructed a progressively more adequate understanding.”

375: if you believe obedience, respect, honor, chastity are truly moral concepts that need to be explained (rather than overcome), then it’s not clear how empathy and role-taking creating these

376: “it seems likely that children enter the world with some initial settings in the social domain which are then extended by cultural learning.”

connectionism and blank slate, like abstract enlightenment philosophy or morality, shouldn’t be addressed too deeply.

\*\*\*fiske’s four moral interactions lightly described but not described well here\*\*\*

377: modularity as a model for innateness

minimalist - “fodor offered a stringent definition of what it takes to be a module and then claimed that there are very few modules in the mind, and none for handling higher-order tasks such as reasoning and moral judgment.”

maximalist - “the vast majority of the mind is composed of modules”

broad modularity is theorized as an inventory of motivations in general, opposed to the specific concerns of morality

378: “there must be an irreducible core set of initial, evolved, architecture-derived content-specific valuation assignment procedures, or the system could not get started.”

massive modularity is controversial as it suggests a lack of cognitive or affective flexibility while humans appear quite flexible, and its implausible to think moral judgments are informationally encapsulated when they are subject to great change with the introduction of additional information

modularity is domain-specific and fast, but morality requires flexibility and can't be readily encapsulated by intuitions

“moderately massive modularity”

379: “they doubt that there are *no* conceptual modules, but they are also skeptical that the mind is Swiss army knife crammed with tools that were fully designed long ago.”

how to explain the diversity and stability of culture

Sperber's solution of massive modularity “highly variable; they are often nested within each other; ... [they] are not innate; they are generated during development by a smaller set of “learning modules” which are innate templates or “learning instincts.”

the term “teeming modularity”

380: “we see this as a new intuition (gut feeling) generated by an innate learning process that can radically alter the value of things on the basis of experience, but only within limits related to evolutionary adaptation.”

381: “cultures create moralities that are unique yet constrained in their variations.”

discusses the process of coming up with moralities from Shweder and Fiske's models and anthropological literature

“social issues that cannot be related to one of the foundations are much harder to teach, or to inspire people to care about.”

“the actual domain never perfectly matches the proper domain; the module produces false positives and false negatives.”

384: there are similar rites and rituals that speak to the moral foundations; four of the five “involve psychological ‘building blocks’ that are present in other primates”

385: “mature moral functioning does not consist only, or even primarily, of simple affective or intuitive reactions to social stimuli.” it grows abstracted

386: “virtues are characteristics of a person that are morally praiseworthy.” they are traits, “dynamic patternings of perception, emotion, judgment, and action.” “virtues are social skills.”

“virtues are acquired inductively, through exposure to ... many examples of the virtue in practice.”  
learned from protagonists in stories

“with respect to morality and to cognition more generally, ... this kind of learning cannot

387: be replaced with top-down learning, such as the acceptance of a rule or principle and the deduction of specific responses from it.”

“the mind ... is a network that gets tuned up gradually by experience.”

“moral maturity is a matter of achieving a comprehensive attunement to the world, a set of highly sophisticate sensitivities embodied in the individual virtues.”

it is “a departure from theories of moralities that see deliberation as the basic moral psychological activity.”

388: “the characteristic developmental trajectory in the moral domain is a movement from crude, global judgments, articulate using a small number of innate moral intuitions, to highly sophisticated and differentiated perceptions, beliefs, emotions responses, and judgments.”

Jerome Bruner distinguishes “the narrative mode of cognition and the paradigmatic or logico-scientific mode”

“arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness.”

389: “for the paradigmatic mode, prostheses include logic, mathematics, and the sciences; for the narrative mode, the most common prosthetic devices are texts” - adding from peterson, metaphor, symbol, allegory – parallelism of experience

“we think that moral thinking, argument, and reflection is much better described as a kind of narrative thinking than as a kind of paradigmatic thinking.”

narratives are hard to test and code into abstracted key words for study

we are “animals who make stories but also animals who are made by stories” - christian smith

390: progressive vs conservative narratives of history – both very strong

“neither narrative is correct in any objective sense. Both are ways that sociologists have tried to make sense of history.”

“without narrative, our moral concepts would be disjointed and hard to integrate into coherent action plans.”

“it seems plausible that human morality and the human capacity for narrativity have co-evolved, mutually reinforcing one another in our recent phylogenetic development.”

391: “the first draft of moral mind has diverse moral content that was specified in advance of experience, but this innately given content gets revised and greatly extended during the course of

development as children actively construct their moral knowledge within a cultural context that uses narrative to shape and guide the development of specific virtues.”

**Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek, “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations,” in *Journal of Personality and Social Philosophy*, Vol 96 No 5 (2009), 1029-1046.**

1029: “Voters who seem to vote against their material self-interest are sometimes said to be voting instead for their values, or for their vision of a good society.”

1030: “Rather than specifying the *content* of a truly moral judgment he specified the *functions* of moral systems: ‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institution, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible.’”

“The *individualizing* approach focuses on individuals as the locus of moral value: Other cultures try to suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions and by binding individuals into roles and duties in order to constrain their imperfect natures.”

“best links between anthropological and evolutionary accounts of morality.”

1031: “we refer to these two foundations as the *individualizing foundations* because they are .. the source of the intuitions that make the liberal philosophical tradition, with its emphasis on the rights and welfare of individuals, so learnable and so compelling to so many people.”

“we refer to those three foundations as the *binding foundations*, because they are ... the source of the intuitions that make conservative and religious moralities, with their emphasis on group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control, so learnable and so compelling to so many people.”

“but given the limits of introspection and the intuitive quality of many moral judgments, such a method does not necessarily measure how people actually make moral judgments.”

**Haidt, Jonathan and Jesse Graham, “Planet of the Durkheimians” in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, Oxford Scholarship Online (May 2009), p 371-401.**

373: “during this transition, the individual took on much greater importance as the unit of society and the unit of value; the centralized state became ever more powerful; and there was a hollowing-out of everything in between. The many low- and mid-level associations and institutions that had proliferated in Western Europe (guilds, extended families, the church, local feudal authorities) were weakened or destroyed. These cataclysmic changes to the social order greatly increased the liberty of most individuals, but the loss of social structure and social integration imposed costs on individuals as well.”

379: “Piaget thought that children constructed much of their morality themselves, rather than learning it from their parents or from society. If adults would just step back and grant them more autonomy, children would reach moral maturity more quickly, including especially an understanding of justice.

Lawrence Kohlberg developed Piaget's ideas further and proposed that moral development is, essentially, the individual's development of ever more adequate reasoning about justice."

380: "In the 1980s and 1990s, several anthropologists objected that Western moral psychology was essentially the psychology of modern cosmopolitan Westerners, and that it could not accommodate many of the moral concerns found in other cultures."

383: "a small set of moral learning modules could explain the high degree of preparedness that moral reactions show: some moral rules are so easily learned that it is not clear that anyone needs to teach them (e.g. the tit for tat rule: 'don't hit first but if someone hits you, hit back'). Other moral rules are so hard to learn that it is not clear they can be inculcated by any means yet discovered (e.g. 'if someone hits you, turn the other cheek with love in your heart.')

"moral development is part of normal enculturation in which the child gradually learns to recognize specific cultural patterns has the right intuitive reactions to those patterns, and then engages in culturally appropriate behaviors."

384: "as a society becomes more modern and more individualistic, the first two foundations become ever more important in daily life and in moral and political philosophy, while the last three become less important."

mention of "many greens and environmentalists seem to ground part of their morality on notions of purity... but we believe that the two versus five formulation works well as a first pass."

385: "conservatives are typically united ... by the belief that long-existing institutions, norms, and traditions embody the wisdom of many generations and should not be tampered with lightly. Combined with a view of human nature that is usually darker than that of liberals and a belief in the limits of human knowledge, conservatives tend to believe that strong institutions and social constraints are necessary for children's socialization, valuable for human welfare, and hard to replace once called into question or delegitimated."

392: "western culture may be failing to do well what cultures do: provide a web or matrix of stories, beliefs, and values that holds a society together, allows individuals to make sense of their lives and sustains them through the trouble and strife of normal existence."

393: "we suggest that human beings are by default Durkheimians who want to live in a thick social world full of shared meanings, symbols, traditions, and communal goals. These are basic human needs, not products of social learning or unconscious conflict resolution."

**Haidt, Jonathan and Selin Kesebir, "Morality," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed., edited by Fisk and Gilbert, 2009, p 1-46.**

2: "the field known as 'moral psychology' was, until recently, a part of developmental psychology

"the 'great narrowing' ... morality got reduced from virtue-based conceptions of the good person down to quandaries about what people should do"

3: “soon after humans beings figured out how to write, they began writing about morality, law religion ... telling people what to do. As the axial age progressed (800 BCE to 200 BCE), many societies East and West began to supplement these lists of rules with a sophisticated psychology of virtue... an important feature of virtue-based approaches is that they aim to educate children not just by teaching rules, but by shaping perceptions, emotions, and intuitions. This is done in part through providing exemplars of particular virtues, often in the form of narratives.”

“virtues are usually thought as multiple ... local .. and often context- or role-specific”

“virtue-based approaches ... emphasize practice and habit, rather than propositional knowledge and deliberative reasoning.”

“virtue-based approaches to morality remained dominant in the West up through the Middle Ages (Christian and Islamic philosophers relied directly on Aristototele)”

4: 18<sup>th</sup> century: “God retreated from the (perceived) management of daily life ... Enlightenment philosophers tried to reconstruct ethics ... from secular first principles.”

“Deontologists focused on duties ... consequentialists ... proposed that actions be judged by their consequences alone”

“These two approaches have been among the main combatants in moral psychology for 200 years ... they have much in common ... parsimony ... moral decisions must be reasoned ... rather than felt or intuited, and a focus on the abstract and universal, rather than the concrete and particular.”

“ethical inquiry from the virtue ethicist’s question of ‘whom should I *become*?’ down to the narrower question of ‘what is the right thing to *do*?’

“ethic has been narrowed to quandary ethics in psychology too.”

“the most generative quandaries were ‘should Heinz steal a drug to save his wife’s life?’ and ‘should I have an abortion?’” Kohlberg and Gilligan respectively

“one of the most active areas of current research in moral psychology uses quandaries in which one choice is deontologically correct (don’t throw a switch that will divert a trolley and kill one...)

5: “...person) and the other is consequentially correct (do kill the one person if it will save five others)”

“psychologists ... have followed philosophers in proposing definitions tailored for quandary ethics.”

“Turiel ... defined the moral domain as ‘prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.’”

“Harris gives us this definition of morality: ‘questions of morality are questions about happiness and suffering ... to the degree that our actions can affect the experience of other creatures positively or negatively, questions of morality apply.’”

“is it possible that Turiel and Harris have defined morality in a parochial way, one that works well for educated, secular Westerners, but that excludes much that other people value?”

6: “construals of the self vary on a dimension from collectivism/interdependence to individualism/independence”

“*Gemeinschaft* (community) to *Gesellschaft* (civil society)”

the former: “refers to the traditional and (until recently) most widespread form of human organization ... relatively small and enduring communities of people bound together by the three pillars ... of shared blood, shared place, and shared mind or belief.”

the latter: “the kind of civil society in which individuals are free to move about, make choices for themselves, and design whatever lives they choose so long as they don’t harm or cheat others.”

“real nations are a mixture of the two types.”

“rather than specifying the *content*...”

7: “...of moral issues... this definition specifies the *function* of moral systems:

moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible.”

“this functionalist approach allows psychology to move from moral parochialism ... to moral pluralism (ie. the belief that there are multiple incompatible but morally defensible ways of organizing a society.”

“social-psychological work must be integrated ‘up’ a level of analysis and made consilient with ‘outside-the-head’ elements studied by anthropologists and sociologists ... also be integrated ‘down’ a level of analysis and made consilient with brain-based explanations of those mechanisms, and with evolutionary accounts of how those mechanisms evolved.”

8: 1990s – affect revolution

“cognitive revolution of prior decades”

“dual process models of behavior in which the ‘automatic’ processes were ancient, fast, emotions and intuitions that E.O. Wilson had described, and the ‘controlled’ process was the evolutionarily newer and motivationally weaker language-based reasoning studied by Kohlberg and relied upon (too heavily) by moral philosophers.”

9: “In the years since 2001, morality has become one the major interdisciplinary topics of research in the academy. Three of the fields most active in this integration are social psychology, social-cognitive neuroscience, and evolutionary science”

“intuitive primacy (but not dictatorship)”



“David Hume, who, like E.O. Wilson, argued for sentiment as the foundation and ‘finer internal sense’ as the mechanism by which we attain knowledge of right and wrong.”

10: “two important kinds of cognition in current moral psychology are moral intuition and moral reasoning; or, as Margolis put it, “seeing-that” and “reasoning-why.”

“Moral intuition has been defined as *the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.*”

“But whereas many automatic processes have no affect, moral intuitions (as defined here) are a subclass of automatic processes that always involve at least a trace of ‘evaluative feeling.’ moral intuitions are about good and bad.”

“in contrast to moral intuition, moral reasoning has been defined as *conscious mental activity that consists of transformation given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgement.*”

“this contrast is similar to the one made in Chaiken’s Heuristic-Systematic Model, as well as the one widely used by behavioral economists between “system 1” and “system 2” (sloman, 1996.)

wikipedia extends this legacy further

“the two processes are thought to run with some independence

11: “in moral thinking, however, reasoning appears to have less power and independence; a variety of motives bias it towards finding support for the conclusions already reached by intuitive processes.”

even the trolley problem shows intuitive primacy in moral evaluations

“complementary work on healthy people has used trolley-type dilemmas pitting consequentialist and deontological outcomes against each other. This work shows that the choices people make can be predicted by the intensity and time course of activation in emotion...”

12: “...areas, relative to areas associated with cool deliberation. When emotion areas are most strongly activated, people tend to choose the deontological outcome (don’t push the person off of a footbridge, even to stop a train and save five others). But in scenarios that trigger little emotional response, people tend to choose the utilitarian response (go ahead and throw a switch to divert a train that will end up killing one instead of five)” - Greene research 2001 2004 \*\*

13: “studies suggest that infants are also born with at least the rudiments of an intuitive ethics.”

“including the ability by 5 months of age to detect and prefer member’s of one’s ingroup based on their accent ...

14: “...and the ability by 18 months of age to detect when another person needs help and then to offer appropriate help.”

“manipulating emotions changes judgments”

primed with comedy (lowered negative affect), disgusting smells, or hypnotic suggestion changes moral outcomes – moral dumbfounding

15: “these findings are consistent with the notion that the judgment process and the justification process are somewhat independent.”

“people are generally found to be biased hypothesis testers. People choose one side as their starting point and then show a strong confirmation bias; they set out to find *any* evidence to support their initial idea. If they succeed, they usually stop searching.

16: “psychologists who study political behavior have generally found that intuition, framing, and emotion are better predictors of political preferences than is self-interest, reasoning about policies, or even assessments of the personality traits of a candidate.”

“Westen and Lakoff both agree that liberals in the United States have made a grave error in adopted a rationalist or “Enlightenment” model of the human mind, and therefore assuming that good arguments about good policies will convince voters to vote for the Democratic Party.

17: “moral intuitions related to suffering and empathy sometimes lead to undesirable consequences such as a radically inefficient distribution of charity. ... on a larger scale, charitable giving follows sympathy, not the number of people in need.”

18: “in the social intuitionist model, for example, four of the six links are reasoning links, and reasoning is said to be a frequent contributor to moral judgment in discussions *between people*, and within individuals *when intuitions conflict*”

“those deliberations can – but rarely do – overturn one’s initial intuitive response. This is what is meant by the principle ‘intuitive primacy – but not dictatorship.’”

19: “Greene and colleagues have proposed a more traditional dual process model in which the two processes work independently and often reach different conclusions. ... “Greene described these two modes of processing as ‘controlled cognitive processing,’ which generally leads to consequentialist conclusions that promote the greater good, and ‘intuitive emotional processing’ which generally leads to deontological conclusions about the inviolability of rights, duties, and obligations.”

“The precise roles played by intuition and reasoning in more judgment cannot yet be established based on the existing empirical evidence.” – is this true??

“it is useful to study judgments of extreme cases, but much more work is needed on everyday moral judgment.”

“functionalist explanations involve ‘interpreting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which they are implicated. ... the heart contracts in the complex ways that it does *in order* to propel blood.”

20: “psychology has long been a functionalist science”

“a crucial first step in any functionalist analysis is to specify the larger structure within which a component and its effects are implicated.

“in *intrapsychic functionalism*, the larger structure is the psyche, and moral thinking is done in order to provide intrapsychic benefits such as minimizing intrapsychic conflict, or maintaining positive moods or self-esteem.”

“in *epistemic functionalism*, the larger structure is the person’s representation of the world, and moral thinking is done in order to improve the accuracy and completeness of that knowledge structure.”

“in *social functionalism*, the larger structure is the social agent embedded in a still larger social order, and more thinking is done in order to help the social agent succeed in the social order.”

“many of the puzzles of human morality turn out to be puzzles only for epistemic functionalists, who believe that moral thinking is performed *in order to* find moral truth.”

“the mere existence of morality is a puzzle, one that is deeply intertwined with human’s search for its origins and its uniqueness. Two of the most dramatic and plot-changing moments in the Hebrew bible involve the receipt of moral knowledge – in the Garden of Eden and on Mt. Sinai”

group selection was dismissed in favor of kin selection and reciprocal altruism

“kin selection refers to the process in which genes spread to the extent that they cause organisms to confer benefits on others who share the same gene because of descent from a recent common ancestor. Evidence for the extraordinary degree to which resources...

21: ... and cooperation are channeled toward kin can be found throughout the animal kingdom.”

trivers “proposed reciprocal altruism as a mechanism that could promote the spread of genes for altruism, if those genes led their bearers to restrict cooperation to individuals likely to return the favor.”

“the difficulty of documenting clear cases of reciprocal altruism among non-kin suggests that it may be limited to creatures with very advanced cognitive capacities.”

“kin selection and reciprocal altruism are presented as the evolutionary foundations of morality”

these methods can’t account for cooperation in large groups

“people share 50% of their variable genes with full siblings, 12.5% with first cousins, and just 3% with second cousins.” yet there is “intense cooperation found among extended families and clans in many cultures.”

“even if reciprocal altruism can create hundreds of cooperative *dyads*, it is powerless to create small cooperative *groups*.”

“collectivism is not just an ‘inside-the-head’ trait that expresses itself in cooperative behavior; it requires ‘outside-the-head’ environmental restraints and triggers to work properly.”

22: “we can think of large-scale cooperation as the Rubicon that our ancestors crossed, founding a way of life on the other side that created a quantum leap in ‘non-zero-sumness’” ultrasociality

“what ‘inside the head’ mechanisms were already in place in pre-agricultural minds such that when early agriculturalists create the right ‘outside the head’ products ultra-large-scale cooperation materialized so quickly? - reputation and moralistic rule enforcement are proposed

“scholars have long wondered why people restraint themselves and follow rules that contradict their self-interest.”

“alexander ... proposed that ‘indirect reciprocity’ occurs when people help others in order to develop a good reputation, which elicits further cooperation from others.”

“game-theoretic approaches have elucidated the conditions under which indirect reciprocity can produce high rates of cooperation”

“the most important requirement is that good information is available about reputations”

“the second requirement for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation is that individuals punish those with a bad reputation, at least by withholding cooperation from them.”

23: “when people have the capacity to do more than shun – when they have the ability to punish defectors at some cost to themselves – cooperation rates rise particularly quickly”

“gossip, then, has emerged as a crucial catalyst for cooperation”

“other animals have norms ... however there is no evidence that any non-human animal feels shame or guilt about violating such norms – only fear of punishment.”

“humans ... live in a far denser web of norms, mores, and folkways.”

“in a gossipy world where norms are clear and are carefully and collectively monitored, the possession of a conscience is prerequisite for survival from a social functionalist point of view.”

24: “tetlock ... suggests the metaphor that people often become ‘intuitive politicians’ who strive to maintain positive identities with multiple constituencies; at other times they come ‘intuitive prosecutors’ who try to catch cheaters and free-riders”

“tetlock’s research on decision making shows that complex, open-minded ‘exploratory’ thinking is most common when people learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be accountable to a legitimate audience whose views are unknown, who is interested in accuracy, and who is reasonable well informed.”

“real decisions makers usually engage in thought that is more simple-minded, more likely to conform to the audience’s desires, and more ‘confirmatory’ ... designed to find evidence to support the decision makers’ first instinct.”

“people are more likely to behave prosocially in the presence of others ... the audience need not even be present [nor] real” - security cameras and illustrations of eyes

25: “people readily construct stories about why they did things, even though they do not have access to the unconscious processes that guided their actions.”

“Gazzaniga proposed that the mind contains an ‘interpreter module’ that is always on, always working to generate plausible rather than veridical explanations of one’s actions.”

“people employ conscious, controlled processes to find excuses for their own selfishness, but they do not use these processes when judging others”

26: “people are especially likely to behave in morally suspect ways if a morally acceptable alibi is available”

“as with politicians, the ardor of one’s declarations of righteousness do not predict the rightness of choices made in private, with no witnesses, and with an airtight alibi available.”

“charitable fundraisers gear their appeals to intuitive politicians by selling opportunities for reputation enhancement”

“in order to thrive socially, people must protect themselves from exploitation by those who are trying to advance through manipulation, dishonesty, and backstabbing.”

“reputation and liking are more strongly affected by negative information than by equivalent positive information.”

“one scandal can outweigh a lifetime of public service.”

“specialized circuits or modules that gave individuals an advantage ... have become part of the ‘factory-installed’ equipment of human morality. Cosmides argued that one such module is specialized for social exchange, with a subroutine or sub-module for the detection of cheaters and norm violators.”

29: “intuitive prosecutors are not impartial judges. They reach a verdict quickly and then engage in a biased search for evidence that can be presented to a judge.”

“epistemic functionalism was popular during the cognitive revolution, when theorists assumed that the mind must first create accurate maps of the world before it can decide upon a course of action ... but it is now becoming increasingly clear that cognition is embodied and adapted for biological regulation.”

“as Clark states ... ‘the rational deliberator turns out to be a well camouflaged adaptive responder. Brain, body, world, and artifact are discovered locked together in the most complex of conspiracies.’”

30: “humanity’s moral nature was shaped not just by the competition of individuals *within* groups, but also by the competition of groups *with other groups*.”

“the main objection to group-level selection – the free rider problem – has been answered.”

“great narrowing” - reduction of moral concerns to care and justice

31: “Darwin focused on competition among individual organisms, but he recognized the generality of his theory and he believe that human tribes are higher-level entities subject to natural selection.”

“there were a variety of forced at work among human groups that solved the free-rider problem and made selfishness unprofitable; foremost among these was the need for a good reputation. Darwin also believed that religion helped bind groups together and suppress selfishness.”

“Williams wrote a devastating critique ... nothing is gained by talking about groups as emergent entities. Given prevailing (and erroneous) assumptions about the slowness of genetic change, the porousness of groups, and the difficulty of suppressing free-riding, Williams argued that the math just does not work out to enable group-level selection to have any appreciable effect on genes.”

32: “Dawkins cemented this idea in the popular and scientific imaginations with his metaphor of the ‘selfish gene’”

“three breakthroughs have enabled theorists to escape from the de facto ban”

“at several points in the history of life, mechanisms emerged that solved the free-rider problem and created larger emergent entities. Replicating molecules joined together to form chromosomes; prokaryotes merged together to become the cooperative organelles of eukaryotic cells; single-cell eukaryotes stayed together after division to form multi-cellular organisms; and some multi-cellular organisms stated together after birth to form hives, colonies, and societies. In each of these cases, the evolution of a mechanism for suppressing free-riding at one level led to cooperation by entities at that level, which produced enormous gains from the emergent group, largely through division of labor.”

“group-level analyses are no longer heretical in biology; in a sense, all life forms are now understood to be groups, or even groups of groups.”

“the second major theoretical breakthrough was to recognize that culture was a biological adaptation that made it possible for humans to find many new solutions to the free rider problem. Boyd and richerson proposed ‘dual inheritance theory,’ which posited that the gene pool of a population and the cultural pool of a population are two separate pools of information that undergo natural selection across many generations.”

33: “cultural groups promote uniformity in dress, food choice, ritual practice, and other behaviors used as markers of group membership ... these effects of culture make human groups more like single entities or organisms ... and therefore better candidates for group selection.”

“the third breakthrough ... is the discovery that genetic evolution can happen rapidly, and that it sped up greatly in the last 10 000 years.”

much faster evolution than assumed:

“hundreds and perhaps thousands of genes have changed in response to selection pressures within local populations during the Holocene era – the last ten thousand years. The human genome has not been changing at a glacial pace; in fact, the rate of change accelerated rapidly throughout the last fifty thousand years.”

“no longer can psychologists make genetic stasis in the last 50 thousand years the null hypothesis”

“co-evolution is discussed here to help readers escape from the old and deep prejudice that genes change too slowly, groups are too porous and similar to each other, and free-riding is too profitable to have permitted group-level selection to influence human genes.”

“an implication of this corollary is that intergroup conflict may have played a larger role in human evolution than is generally thought.”

35: just as Darwin said, ‘tribes have supplanted other tribes; and ... morality is one important element in their success.’”

“this is a more traditional morality of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, and solidarity. This is a morality that binds individuals together, suppresses selfishness, and directs people’s strongest moral passions toward the heroes and martyrs who die for the group, and toward the traitors and apostates who must be put to death in the name of the group.”

“campbell ... concluded that the most important cause of social ‘entitativity’ was common fate, followed by similarity, proximity, and ‘preganz,’ or good continuation with clear borders. Groups that move together, share the ups and downs of fortune together, come together periodically, mark and patrol their borders (physical and social), and mark their group membership with clothing, hair styles, bodily alterations, or other badges, are more likely to be perceived as entities.”

“specialized circuits in the visual system for facial detection” - modules?

36: “people sometimes adopt the interests of their group as their own, even when doing so compromises their self-interest.”

“if multi-level selection shaped human beings then we can expect that parochialism is, descriptively, the normal, default, evolutionarily prepared form of human sociality.”

37: “ingroup favoritism becomes even more common when group membership is made salient ... we-ness helps to solve cooperative problems too; higher identification with the group leads to higher investment in a public good dilemma and higher self-restraint in consuming the group’s resources.”

“brewer and caporael posit that selfish and group-oriented motivations are ‘two separation, semiautonomous regulatory system that hold each other in check’ --- every man for himself vs one for all and all for one

“the more people identify with a group, the more they like others who follow the group’s norms, and this effect is larger for moral norms than for non-moral norms ... according to the ‘black sheep effect,’ people are generally less tolerant towards an ingroup member who transgresses social norms than they are toward an equally transgressive...”

38: ...outgroup member”

“a willingness to punish norm-violators, cheaters and free-riders is a crucial component of group maintenance. In economic games, people often punish defectors even if they have to pay for it themselves. Moreover, when people punish free-riders, brain areas related to the processing of rewards are activated, suggesting that such punishment feels good.”

39: “John Locke argued that religious toleration should not be extended to atheists: ‘ promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.’”

“from a multi-level selection perspective religions are generally well-suited for solving the free-rider problem within groups, increasing their levels of cohesion, cooperation, and coordination, and improving their chances of outcompeting less religious groups.”

40: “the world’s major religions generally include a well-developed set of practices and beliefs for suppressing not just selfishness but also the discomfort of self-consciousness.”

“consistent with this view, a review of the historical and cross-cultural evidence indicates that gods seem to become more powerful, moralistic, and punitive as group size grows ... people who believed in an angry, punishing god cheated less; people who believed in a loving, forgiving god cheated the most.”

41: “Haidt and Joseph (2004) reviewed four works that offered lists or taxonomies of moral values or social practices across cultures (Brown 1991; Fiske, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Shweder et al., 1997). they also included de Waal’s (1996) description of the ‘building blocks’ of morality that are found in other primates.”

42: “Liberals are trying to build the ideal Gesellschaft, an open, diverse, and cosmopolitan place in which the moral domain is limited to the issues described by Turiel: justice, rights, and welfare.”

“Ingroup/loyalty is associated with racism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism; ...

43: ... authority/respect is associated with oppression, authoritarianism, and system justification; and purity/sanctity is associated with homophobia and other disgust-based restrictions on the rights of women and some minority or immigrant groups.”

“moral psychology lost these perspectives in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as many psychologists followed philosophers and other social scientists in embracing rationalism and methodological individualism.”

**Haidt, Jonathan, and Jesse Graham and Craig Joseph, “Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations” in *Psychological Inquiry*, Vol 20, No 2/3 (April-September 2009), p. 110-119**

“Using just the Harm and Fairness foundations, one simply cannot construct convincing arguments against gay marriage. The absence of good arguments based on harm and fairness leads liberals to conclude that conservatives are motivated by simple and immoral homophobia. Cultural conservatives, however, are more likely to see gay people as members of a different culture (attacking or infiltrating the heterosexual ingroup) who subvert gender roles (rejecting the authority of church, law, and tradition) while pursuing a carnal and hedonistic lifestyle (including ‘impure’ sexual acts that trigger feelings of disgust). The opposition of these social conservatives may well be linked “downwards” to traits such as openness to experience, but it must also be linked ‘upwards’ to the third level of meaning an identity. Consciously or unconsciously, opposition to gay marriage is related for some of these people to Judeo-Christian narratives of virtue, sex, and self-control, such as the story of Adam and Eve.



We cannot truly understand the opposition to gay marriage ... by showing that conservatives are low on openness to experience and high of disgust sensitivity. there's a lot more going on."

Suhler, Christopher and Patricia Churchland, "Can Innate, Modular 'Foundations' Explain Morality? Challenges for Haidt's Moral Foundation Theory." in *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 23, Feb 2011, p 2103-2116.

2103: "a comprehensive explanatory framework" for morality

2104: "second-order modules produce moral intuitions – flashes of approval, disapproval, or other emotions upon detecting some pattern in the social world. These intuitions, in turn, are what actually drive our moral judgments beliefs, actions, and the like. This is an important point of divergence between MFT and views of morality historically accepted in philosophy(Kant) and psychology (Kohlberg), which have tended to focus on reason as the sole drive of moral judgment. On Haidt's view, by contrast, reasoning plays a mostly post hoc role, coming into play only after (affective) intuitions produce a moral judgment and serving to justify that judgment to others

"recognition of emotion and intuition as important contributors to moral behavior and judgment."

"the theory's rejection of the common philosophical project of searching for a single, unified principle or psychological mechanism that, by itself, accounts for all of morality, a project that has thus far proved something of a quagmire."

2105: "Haidt's recognition of the need to provide a developmental and evolutionary account of morality"

without material, hard ground, the level of analysis is more subjective and not reconcilable, consilient with current genetic understanding

no answers "at the level of cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, and so on"  
"empirical evaluation"

2106: "a problem for the second-order modules, which seem to be little more than a way of designating somewhat arbitrarily chosen stimulus-behavior patterns without shedding any light on the underlying processes' computational works."

"the mere commonness of moral norms corresponding to the five foundations and the ease with which some adaptionist account can be concocted for this commonness do not sanction the move to something as concrete as domain-specific, genetically endowed learning modules." better explanations "involve the combined effect of numerous nondedicated processes and their interactions" - isn't this what MFT is based on?

Partial encapsulation as moral dumbfounding is the general dual cognitive system conundrum?

2107: "by and large, liberals also have significant moral concerns that arguably fall within these three categories; the *contents* or *targets* of these concerns just happen not to be the same as those of conservatives"

2108: leftist purity with the environment – this comes up often

social welfare is supported by the left but isn't individualistic

2109: "progress in neurobiology, developmental psychology, and genetics in recent decades means that innateness hypotheses are now expected to be supported by, or at least consistent with, evidence from these fields" - Haidt slams this; MFT doesn't violate these fields whose progress is greatly overstated

"if there are Haidt-type mental modules, we should expect the organization of the brain to reflect or at an absolute minimum, be consistent with such modularity." - the association of gray matter and moral foundations in the 2012 paper suggest some physical correlates to the model

they seem to question encapsulation in general as remote parts of the brain are able to connect at any time, even within early visual processing

2110: "the pervasiveness of such neural overlap and connectivity casts doubt on the hyperspecialized modules that Haidt appears to favor with his second-order modules."

"another example of a neurobiological system that cuts across domains – including the domains picked out by the five foundations – is the mammalian system for attachment and bonding, in which neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin are known to play a crucial role. This system is deeply involved in care for preferred conspecifics such as offspring and mates, but it also plays an important role in group-oriented behaviors such as defensive responses to threats. As such, it plausibly cuts across the harm/care and ingroup/loyalty foundations."

"the oxytocin/vasopressin system may also make important contributions to behaviors associated with the fairness/reciprocity foundation."

there is no material basis for the discrete foundations, from particular emotions to brain regions to neurochemicals.

"a common theme running through these examples is that evolution, as well as brain development, tends to be very conservative, typically extended, reappropriating, or modifying extant neurobiological mechanisms rather than engineering wholly new, dedicated mechanisms for each new challenge that the environment throws an organism's way." so "claims of domain specificity or of strict divisions between the foundations are not honored by neurobiology."

a shared physical foundation can't get entangled simultaneously in two systems that give rise to distinct emergence properties? These research exclude such a possibility and view high order developments as linear products of simpler manifestations

"although the general idea that our evolved biology contributes to 'our nature' is unsullied, the constraints on tenable hypotheses regarding specific links between genes, brains, and behavior have become vastly more demanding in the last decade. Claims to the effect that a given behavior is 'innate' or 'prepared for' or 'organized in advance of experience' are more much difficult to substantiate, now that we have a clearer idea what, evidentially, we are up against."

**Ditto, Peter et al., "Understanding Libertarian Morality." Aug 20 2010: 1-29.**

3: “libertarians, who are sometimes described as being conservative on economic issues but liberal on social issues”

“in one nationally representative poll, only 9% of voters self-identified as libertarian, but 44% were willing to describe themselves as ‘fiscally conservative and socially liberal, also known as libertarian,’ indication that libertarian ideas are attractive to many.”

4: “libertarians cannot be readily classified on the standard left-right dimension”

“all types of libertarianism trace their origins back to the enlightenment thinkers of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century who argued that states, laws, and governments exist for the benefit of the people. The *individual* is the unit of value, and the liberty of the individual is the essential precondition for human flourishing.”

“libertarianism has historically rejected the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others ... libertarianism stayed close to locke’s and mill’s notions of liberty as freedom from interference, which the philosopher Isaiah Berlin later called ‘negative liberty.’”

“in the emerging social democracies of europe, as in the american new deal and great society eras, government action came to be seen as essential for ensuring ‘positive liberty’ by providing the social conditions – such as education, health care, financial security – that enable people to pursue their own happiness.”

5: “opposition to high taxes and big government is not just an ‘economic’ position: it is a *moral* position as well. It is a principled opposition to a social order which may be characterized as unfair, tyrannical, and/or wasteful”

“libertarians seem willing to reject both liberal concerns for social justice and conservative concerns for respecting existing social structure when those concerns conflict with their superordinate interest in maintaining individual liberty.”

10: “the results suggest that libertarians are less likely to see moral traits as important to their core self”

12: look up: Schwartz value of Self-Direction, and the importance of independence

13: libertarians score low on the traits that indicate an orientation toward engaging with and pleasing others”

disgust scale – core disgust with microbes, animal reminders disgust as human are animals, and contamination from other people

14: empathizer-systemizer scale of Baron-Cohen

“libertarians are the only group scored higher on systemizing than empathizing”

16: “as predicted, libertarians showed lower levels of emotional responsiveness on standard measures of the moral emotions of disgust and empathy.”

18: “libertarians feel relatively low levels of connection to their community, country, and people globally.”

19: “libertarians may be less happy in part because they care less about others and (most likely) bond less with others, particularly close others.”

20: “the only emotional reaction on which libertarians were not lowest was reactance – the angry reaction to infringements upon one’s autonomy – for which libertarians scored higher than both liberals and conservatives.”

**Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph, “How Moral Foundations Theory Succeeded in Building on Sand: A Response to Suhler and Churchland” in *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* vol 23 no 9, Sept 2011, p 2117-2122**

2117: Chris Boehm tells the evolutionary story of liberty or domination “it includes the hypervigilance of egalitarian hunter-gatherers for any sign of alpha male behavior, including boasting.”

2118: “Suhler and Churchland accuse us of an ‘ad hoc’ approach to theory construction, and they advise us to take a more ‘principled’ approach. But the ‘principled’ approach is part of what doomed previous grand theories in psychology.”

“one of us is developing Hume’s claim that morality is like a taste, not like reasoning”

you don’t focus on “analyzing the nutritional needs of human beings and then positing a set of receptors that would guide people to the right foods.”

“social conservatives (on average) live in a world more saturated with the magical thinking of the purity foundation than do liberals. Liberals score lower on measures of disgust sensitivity that have nothing to do with politics.”

“of course, innateness hypotheses should not be *incompatible* with well-established findings from those fields, but Suhler and Churchland are asking for much more; they want to see positive links to those three fields, including the identification of candidate genes and neural systems.”

2119: “despite the fact that just about everything is heritable, there do not appear to be genes ‘for’ traits. The human genome project failed to find genes or even sets of dozens of genes that account for more than a few percent of the variance in any target disease or trait. Even for physical height, which has a heritability of 0.9 and can be measured with nearly perfect accuracy, nobody can find a gene or set of genes that explain why some people are taller than others.”

“we have always treated moral modules as *functional* modules, not as physical, anatomical, or neurobiological modules.”

2120: “given that just about every trait you can imagine, from divorce proneness to musical preferences, is heritable, we are quite content to say that most behavioral and cognitive traits draw to some degree on innate traits, abilities, and interests.”

“functional specialization is a basic feature of systems designed by natural selection. The digestive system, for example, is a functionally specialized module within the body, and its function is to extract

nutrients from food. It, in turn, is composed of smaller modules, each with a specialized function related to the specific type of input that it received. You cannot understand any structure in the digestive system without first knowing its function and its inputs.

The situation is similar in cognition: different kinds of information are handled by different systems.”

“the moral min includes at least five sets of modules that are functionally specialized to handle informational inputs related to social events”

modules like attractors?

“functional modules might or might not (someday) turn out to be coincident with neurological models, but they should be evaluated and tested by research on how people process information.”

polygenesis of concepts and beliefs doesn't necessarily mean there are functional modules underlying them, but then at what point can you say a coincidence is sufficiently meaningful?

Refer to purity and sanctity, cooties, as polygenetic concepts

**Jesse, Jesse et al., *Mapping the Moral Domain*, in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol 101, No 2, 2011, 366-385.**

366: “people vary in the extent to which they endorse, value, and use these give foundations, providing an opportunity to better understand moral diversity.”

“a major goal of MFT is to expand the range of phenomena studied in moral psychology so that it matches the full range of moral concerns, including those found in non-Western cultures, in religious practices, and among political conservatives.”

“a great variety of scale are used in moral psychology ... all share the assumption that the moral domain is limited to concerns about individuals harming or unfairly treating other individuals.”

“Kohlberg's posconventional morality enshrined politically liberal ideals as developmental endpoints.”

“kohlberg and Turiel based their based their circumscription of the moral domain on a line of enlightenment thinking running from immanuel kant to john stuart mill to john rawls in which the autonomy and/or welfare of the individual are the starting point for ethical inquiry.”

before the enlightenment, the moral domain was broader. “much of ancient moral philosophy, from greece to india to japan, was virtue-based ...it treated virtues as habits developed by repeated use ... moral education includes not only instructions in care and justice but training in how to be a good group member.”

“Pincoffs documented the gradual narrowing of philosophical inquiry in the West since the 19<sup>th</sup> century as philosophers moved away from virtue ethics and adopted what Pincoffs calls *quandary ethics*. Should psychologists follow philosophers in this turn to quandary ethics? Or should we keep our eyes focused on what is, rather than on the Enlightenment concept of what *ought* to be?”

368: Haidt and Kesebir:

“moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible.”

define morality by function, not content ie justice, rights, welfare

“individuals are often unable to access the causes of their moral judgments”

practices of reciprocal gift exchange – Mauss – reciprocal altruism – Trivers

origins of the system:

in 2004 Haidt and Joseph began surveying the literatures in evolutionary psychology and anthropology looking for matches across cultures that had some clear counterpart in evolutionary thinking.

Incorporated fiske’s four social relationships, shweders three ethics, and Hogan’s socioanalytic theory of moral development.

In 2007 haidt and graham expanded the theory and applied it to the culture wars of the united states.

369: the first draft of the MFO was created in part to test this hypothesis about ideological differences into questionnaires to test the model

373: “harm-related groups were nurses,

374: environmentalists, pacifists, vegetarians, and hunters. Fairness-related groups...” ADD TO THE LIST OF CHARACTERISTICS FOR EACH

380: “gender differences were much stronger than the differences between eastern and western cultures.”

“many people and cultures are concerned about how people treat their own bodies – whether they treat them as playgrounds for their own pleasure or as temples created by God to house a soul within.”

381: “woman valued Harm, Fairness, and Purity more than men, even controlling for political ideology.”

“we also need basic descriptive work on the development of judgment and reasoning about ingroups, authority, and purity. A question of particular interest will be whether moral maturity involves shifting from one pattern of foundation usage to another.”

“Kohlberg was criticized for treating a liberal set of values as a developmental progression beyond a conservative set of values ... MFT does not make normative claims about which kinds of concerns are better than others”

382: we included concerns about liberty in the fairness foundation, because fairness gives rise to notions of rights.”

“ingroup and authority tend to intercorrelate highly across analyses, but our investigation so far suggests that it is reasonable and useful to keep them separate.”

**Haidt, Jonathan. *The Righteous Mind*. Vintage Books (New York), 2012.**

xviii: “this book is about why it’s so hard for us to get along.”

a new way to think about politics and religion

xix: “human nature is not just intrinsically moral, it’s also intrinsically moralistic, critical, and judgmental.”

xx: “when I was a teenager I wished for world peace, but now I yearn for a world in which competing ideologies are kept in balance, systems of accountability keep us all from getting away with too much, and fewer people believe that righteous ends justify violent means.”

5: how Haidt got into moral psychology, how in 1987 it is a part of developmental psychology.  
Anthropological authorial disclosure

where does morality come from?

nativist: “moral knowledge is native to our minds” - pre-loaded  
empiricist: “moral knowledge comes from nurture.” - blank slates

6: rationalism: “kids figure out morality for themselves”

Piaget cognitive development model explained – kids learn about the world themselves

7: morality is “*self-constructed* as kids play with other kids.”

“playing games, having arguments, and working things out together will help them learn about fairness far more effectively than any sermon from adults.”

“*rationalist* to describe anyone who believes that reasoning is the most important and reliable way to obtain moral knowledge.”

8: Lawrence Kohlberg designed a six-stage model of moral development off of Piaget’s rational model

from conventional and petty legalisms: “kids at this stage care a lot about conformity, and they have great respect for authority”

9: post-conventional “still value honesty and respect rules and law, but now they sometimes justify dishonesty or lawbreaking in pursuit of still higher goods, particularly justice”

“[Kohlberg] used his research to build a scientific justification for a secular liberal moral order.”

10: “Piaget and Kohlberg both thought that parents and other authorities were obstacles to moral development.”

“he transformed moral psychology into a boomer-friendly ode justice.”

“denigrating authority, hierarchy, and tradition ... support worldviews that were secular, questioning, egalitarian.”

11: former Kohlberg student Elliott Turiel discovered kids can recognize the difference between conventional rules like uniforms and “rules related to ‘justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.’”

12: “children construct their moral understanding on the bedrock of the absolute moral truth that *harm is wrong.*”

“morality is about *treating individuals well.*”

this was the lay of the land when Haidt approached the subject

13: he found it dry and cerebral, not emotional or passionate enough from his lived experience

2<sup>nd</sup> year grad school took an anthropology course with Alan Fiske - “no matter the topic” of ethnographies, “morality turned out to be a central theme.”

14: “began to see the United States and Western Europe as extraordinary historical exceptions.” “found a way to strip down and thin out the thick, all-encompassing moral orders that the anthropologists wrote about.”

rules about food, purity and pollution, taboos to the West are conventional but key in other places

15: Leviticus is the same, avoid disease, avoid disgust, “keeping categories pure or not mixing things together”

“cleanliness is next to godliness.”

sexual prudes of the right vs. organic free-range food of the left - “pose a greater threat spiritually than biologically.”

16: Richard Shweder, Alan Fiske’s teacher, discussed the difference between individualist and collectivist perspectives on morality

“person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole”

17: sociocentric focus of most societies vs individualist “makes society a servant to the individual.”

Shweder saw Kohlberg/Turiel morality was too Western/modern and tested by interviewing Chicago and Indian kids in Orissa

18: “morality was much broader and thicker in Orissa; almost any practice could be loaded up with moral force.”



21: Fiske rebutted Shweder and Haidt decided to make up for the inadequacies

22: “stories that pitted gut feelings about important cultural norms against reasoning about harmlessness, and then see which force was stronger.”

Haidt went to Buenos Aires for his study

23: worked with local researchers to study both upper and lower class people there, Brazil...

24: ... and Philadelphia. “three by two by two” - three locations, two classes, two age levels – results supported Shweder

25: “The upper-class Brazilians looked just like the Americans on these stories ... the size of the moral-conventional distinction varied across cultural groups.”

“unexpectedly, the effect of social class was much larger than the effect of the city. In other words, well-educated people in all three cities were more similar to each other than they were to their lower-class neighbors. I had flown five thousand miles south to search for moral variation when in fact there was more to be found a few blocks west of campus, in the poor neighborhood surrounding my university.”

26: “there must be other sources of moral knowledge, including cultural learning or innate moral intuitions about disgust and disrespect.”

28: people tried to invent victims to victimless moral violations to justify their conclusions

“were people really condemning the actions *because* they foresaw these harms, or was it the reverse process – were people *inventing* these harms because they had already condemned the actions?”

29: “they seemed to be *morally dumbfounded*-- rendered speechless by their inability to explain verbally what they knew intuitively”

“it was not reasoning in search of truth; it was reasoning in support of their emotional reactions.”

“moral reasoning was often a servant of moral reactions” following Hume

the paper got no attention for five years – too outside the scope of established moral psychology

32: “one of the greatest truths in psychology is that the mind is divided into part that sometimes conflict”

33: Plato held contempt towards the passions

34: “there is a direct line running from Plato through Immanuel Kant to Lawrence Kohlberg.” - the rationalist delusion

“I call it a delusion because when a group of people make something sacred, the members of the cult lose the ability to think clearly about it.”

36: “Jefferson gives us a third option, in which reason and sentiment are (and ought to be) independent co-rulers.”

Social Darwinism turned social science against nativism and pre-loaded moral values

37: “if Hitler was a nativist, then all nativists were Nazis.”

1960s and 1970s: “Radical reformers usually want to believe that human nature is a blank slate on which any utopian vision can be sketched.”

Steven Pinker and E O Wilson were exceptions; Wilson was attacked for it

38: “It seemed clear to Wilson that what the rationalists were *really* doing was generating clever justifications for moral intuitions that were best explained by evolution. Do people believe in human rights because such rights actually exist, like mathematical truths, sitting on a cosmic shelf next to the Pythagorean theorem just waiting to be discovered by Platonic reasoners? Or do people feel revulsion and sympathy when they read accounts of torture, and then invent a story about universal rights to help justify their feelings?”

biology, philosophy, and evolution would merge – consilience

39: sociobiology was discredited but Frans de Waal looked into the emotions of chimps influencing their moral-seeming behavior, Antonio Damasio looked at brain-damaged people found those without emotional experience failed to make good decisions in life

40: “here were people in whom brain damage had essentially shut down communication between the rational soul and the seething passions of the body ... yet the result of the separation was not the liberation of reason from the thrall of the passions. It was the shocking revelation that reasoning *requires* the passions.”

41: rebirth of sociobiology in 1992 as evolutionary psychology

Haidt worked with the dual-process model at UVA

42: cognitive load has no effect on the quality of moral judgments – even if forced to respond quickly or to wait

43: worked with undergraduate Scott Murphy to test moral dumbfounding

44/45: tests are done to see if participants can be morally dumbfounded in different victimless taboo situations

47: “it’s obvious people were making a moral judgment immediately and emotionally. Reasoning was merely the servant of the passions, and when the servant failed to find any good arguments, the master did not change his mind.”

“moral reasoning was mostly just a post hoc search for reasons to justify the judgments people had already made.”

50: “judgment and justification are separate processes.”

two kinds of cognitive processes:

“‘see-that’ is the pattern matching that brains have been doing for hundreds of millions of years. ... animals easily learn new patterns and connect them up to their existing behaviors, which can be reconfigured into new patterns as well”

“Margolis also called this kind of thinking ‘intuitive.’”

“‘reasoning-why,’ in contrast, is the process ‘by which we describe how we think we reached a judgment, or how we think another person could reach that judgment.’”

“...can only occur for creatures that have language and a need to explain themselves to other creatures.”

“it’s conscious, it sometimes *feels* like work, and it’s easily disrupted by cognitive load.”

52: “we do moral reasoning not to reconstruct the actual reasons why *we ourselves* came to a judgment; we reason to find the best possible reasons why *somebody else ought to join us* in our judgment.”

Haidt was stuck contrasting cognition and emotion until he realized...

53: “*emotions are a kind of information processing*. Contrasting emotion with cognition is therefore as pointless as contrasting rain with weather, or cars with vehicles.”

“*Intuition* is the best word to describe the dozens or hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments and decisions that we all make every day. Only a few of these intuitions come to us embedded in full-blown emotions.”

rider “controlled, processes, including ‘reasoning-why’

elephant “automatic processes, including emotion, intuition, and all forms of ‘seeing-that’

54: “the rider (language-based reasoning) evolved because it did something useful for the elephant.”

“it can see further into the future ... learn new skills ... acts as the spokesman for the elephant.”

“the rider is skilled at fabricating post hoc explanations for whatever the elephant has just done, and it is good at finding reasons to justify whatever the elephant wants to do next.”

55: diagram of model of three parts of reasoning with others “social intuitionist model” - might be worth reviewing in report

58: “if you really want to change someone’s mind on a moral or political matter, you’ll need to see things from that person’s angle as well as your own.”

59: to persuade readers haidt “decided to weave together the history of moral psychology and my own personal story to create a sense of movement from rationalism to intuitionism. I threw in historical

anecdotes, quotations from the ancients, and praise of a few visionaries. I set up metaphors that will recur throughout the book.”

63: hypnosis made words flash feelings of disgust: “subjects made up absurd reasons to justify judgments that they has made on the basis of gut feelings.”

“intuitions come first”

“the instant I knew the content of the criticism, my innter lawyer went to work searching for an excuse”

64: “brains evaluate instantly and constantly”

“brains evaluate everything in terms of potential threat or benefit to the self, and then adjust behavior to get more of the good stuff and less of the bad. Animal brains make such appraisals thousands of times a day with no need for conscious reasoning, all in order to optimize the brain’s answer to the fundamental question of animal life: approach or avoid?”

65: 1890s Wilhelm Wundt - “affective primacy” “small flashes of positive or negative feeling that prepare us to approach or avoid something.” - often too small/quick to be considered an emotion

we like or dislike as we perceive, before conceiving what we are perceiving

1980 Robert Zajonc revived the concept to counter “cool, rational information processors” vision of humans

people like things more just by being exposed to them more

66: feeling is the first process - “it happens first ... it is more powerful”  
thinking happens second - “new ability, rooted in language and not closely related to motivation.”  
thinking “can be a useful advisor”

“the rider is the attendant servant, always trying to anticipate the elephant’s next move”

67: “affective priming” - “a flash of affect that primes the mind to go one way or the other” something that shares valence with the primer makes the second thing get perceived faster

68: examples – implicit bias is revealed against racial groups, the obese and old; political partisanship; trusting/lighter punishment for attractive people

69: “we can have multiple intuitions arising simultaneously, each one processing a different kind of information”

Alex Todorov “found that the candidate that people judged more competent was the one who actually won the race about two-third of the time”

70) embodied responses: affective priming with bad smells creating harsher judgments

71) Chenbo Zhong: washing hands makes one more moralistic about purity, or thinking about one’s transgressions makes one want to get clean

“immortality makes us feel physically dirty, and cleansing ourselves can sometimes make us more concerned about guarding our moral purity.”

72-73) psychopaths “are unmoved by the needs, suffering, or dignity of others. The elephant doesn’t respond with the slightest lean to the gravest injustice. The ride is perfectly normal ... but the rider’s job is to serve the elephant, not to act as a moral compass”

74) babies are prewired to assume newtonian physics, as suggested by their surprise when these rules are broken.

75) Also prewired to recognize good and bad social interactions

“by six months of age, infants are watching how people behave toward *other people*, and they are developing a preference for those who are nice rather than those who are mean.” - long before language

76-77) “[Joshua] Greene had a hunch that gut feelings were what often drove people to make deontological judgments, whereas utilitarian judgments were more cool and calculating” he was right

79) “the rider evolved to serve the elephant, but it’s a dignified partnership, more like a lawyer serving a client than a slave serving a master.” - requests are impossible, self-destructive, can not be answered

80) rarely can people independently overcome their initial judgments

81) delaying the response time to stimulus can dampen its affective power

86) “reason is not fit to rule; it was designed to seeking justification, not truth.”

“people care a great deal more about appearance and reputation than about reality.”

“the most important principle for designing an ethnical society is to *make sure that everyone’s reputation is on the line all the time*, so that bad behavior will always bring bad consequences.”

william james functionalism – what the heart does, not just what it is matters.

Is moral reasoning “to help us find the truth, so that we can know the right way to behave and condemn those who behave wrongly?”

87) or “help us pursue socially strategic goals, such as guarding our reputations and convincing other people to support us, or our team, in disputes”

“we are all intuitive politicians”

accountability is key for non-kin cooperation

88) when it comes to the physical world we are naive scientists, but in the social world we seek to improve our appearance – Glauconian

if people know they will be held accountable, they act more careful, systematically and self-critically

“*exploratory thought* is an ‘even handed consideration of alternative points of view.’”

“*confirmatory thought* is ‘a one-sided attempt to rationalize a particular point of view.’”

“accountability increases exploratory thought only when three conditions apply: (1) decisions makers learn before forming an opinion that they will be accountable to an audience, (2) the audience’s views are unknown, and (3) they believe the audience is well informed and interested in accuracy.”

89) otherwise, “accountability pressures simply increase confirmatory thought. People are trying harder to *look* right than to *be* right.”

“we want to believe the things we are about to say to others.”

“our moral thinking is much more like a politician searching for votes than a scientists searching for truth”

90) “[Mark] Leary suggested that self-esteem is more like an internal gauge, a ‘sociometer’ that continuously measures your value as a relationship partner. Whenever the sociometer needle drops, it triggers an alarm and changes our behavior”

91) the sociometer “it’s part of the elephant”

“our in-house press secretary automatically justifies everything”

92) “they’re told what the policy is, and their job is to find evidence and arguments that will justify the policy to the public.”

93) “*confirmation bias*, the tendency to seek out and interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what you already think.”

94) the more arguments someone can make for something, the more likely they are to go farther in education

“schools don’t *teach* people to reason thoroughly; they *select* applicants with higher IQs, and people with higher IQs are able to generate more reasons.”

“smart people make really good lawyers and press secretaries, but they are no better than others at finding reasons on the other side.”

95) “we lie, cheat, and justify so well that we honestly believe we are honest”

96) ‘plausible deniability’ allows people to justify lies of omission

97) “they cheated only up to the point where they themselves could no longer find a justification that would preserve their belief in their own honesty.”

98) Tom Gilovich: “when we *want* to believe something, we ask ourselves, ‘*can* I believe it?’ then, we search for supporting evidence, and if we find even a single piece of pseudo-evidence, we can stop thinking. We now have permission to believe.

When we *don't* want to believe something, we ask ourselves, '*must* I believe it?' then we search for contrary evidence, and if we find a single reason to doubt the claim, we can dismiss it. You only need one key to unlock the handcuffs of *must*."

motivated reasoning

100) "we can believe almost anything that supports our team"

"self-interest is a weak predictor of policy preferences" with voting

"political opinions function as 'badges for social membership.'"

102) 'attitude polarization'

103) "extreme partisanship may be literally addictive"

"rationalist delusion"

"from plato through kant and kohlberg" - think reason dictates better behavior

104) "anyone who values truth should stop worshiping reason. ... reasoning ... evolved not to help us find truth but to help us engage in arguments, persuasion, and manipulation in the context of discussions with other people."

105) "confirmation bias is a built-in feature ... not a bug that can be removed."

"what i'm saying is that we must be wary of any *individual's* ability to reason. We should see each individual as being, limited, like a neuron."

"if you put neurons together in the right way you get a brain; you get an emergent system that is much smarter and more flexible than a single neuron."

"we should not expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truth-seeking, reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns are in play."

"individuals feel some common bond or shared fate that allows them to interact civilly, you can create a group that end up producing good reasoning as an emergent property of the social system. This is why it's so important to have intellectual and ideological diversity within any group or institution whose goal is to find truth."

106) "nobody is ever going to invent an ethics class that makes people behave ethically."

"you can make minor and inexpensive tweaks to the environment, which can produce big increased in ethical behavior."

chapter 5

112) "Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic"

“WEIRD people are statistical outliers; they are the least typical, least representative people you could study if you want to make generalizations about human nature.”

113) *“the WEIRDer you are, the more you see a world full of separate objects, rather than relationships ... even visual perception is affected.”*

“most people think holistically, but WEIRD people think more analytically”

114) western philosophers have made “moral systems that are individualistic, rule-based, and universalist.”

non-WEIRD: “something more like the Analects of Confucius, a collection of aphorisms and anecdotes that can’t be reduced to a single rule.”

individualistic morality and individual rights vs sociocentric morality needs “additional virtues to bind people together.”

115) “Shweder was the leading thinker in cultural psychology – a new discipline that combined the anthropologist’s love of context and variability with the psychologist’s interest in mental processes.”

“culture and psyche make each other up”

116) schweder “found three major clusters of moral themes, which they called the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity.”

autonomy: “people are ... autonomous individuals with want, needs, and preferences. People should be free to satisfy these ... as they see fit, and so societies develop more concepts such as rights, liberty, and justice ... this is the dominant ethic in individualistic societies.”

community: “people are ... members of larger entities such as families, teams, armies, companies, tribes, and nations. These larger entities are more than the sum of the people who compose them; they are real, they matter, and they must be protected. People have an obligation to play their assigned roles in these...”

117) ...entities. Many societies therefore develop moral concepts such as duty, hierarchy, respect, reputation, and patriotism.” individualism will “weaken the social fabric and destroy the institutions and collective entities upon which everyone depends.”

divinity: “people are ... temporary vessels within which a divine soul have been implanted. People are not just animals ... the body is a temple, not a playground. Even if it does no harm and violates nobody’s rights .... [taboos] degrade him ... and violates the sacred order of the universe. ...sanctity and sin, purity and pollution, elevation and degradation.”

haidt learned of these after his work in brazil

118) left for india for more research – found being there and culture shock taught more than his studies

119) developing sympathy for sex-segregated and role-based life – not just intellectually got it but felt it



120) understood ethic of community more; “emphasis on bathing, food choices, and concerns about what or whom a person has touched... christians believe that ‘cleanliness is next to godliness.’

121) disgust “keeps us away from dirty and contaminating things’ - repurposed for some moral violations but not others

theory “vertical dimension of social space, running from God or moral perfection at the top down through angels, humans, other animals, monsters, demons, and then the devil, or the perfect devil, at the bottom.”

“high=good=pure=God whereas low=bad=dirty=animal.” “seems to be a kind of archetype (if you like Jungian terminology) or innately prepared idea (if you prefer the language of evolutionary psychology”

degradation vs elevation

122) “creating a sharp boundary between dirty and clean spaces.”

“in the ethic of divinity, there is an order to the universe, and things (as well as people) should be treated with the reverences or dis-...

123) ...gust that they deserve.”

sacrilege, dirtier, profane, degraded

124) “the ethic of divinity is sometimes incompatible with compassion, egalitarianism, and basic human rights.”

against “crass consumerism and mindless or trivialized sexuality. We can understand long-standing laments about the spiritual emptiness of a consumer society in which everyone’s mission is to satisfy their personal desires.”

125) stepping out of the matrix: “the world we experience is an illusion, akin to a dream. Enlightenment is a form of waking up.”

Haidt was “red pill” by Shweder’s writings. “I began to see that many moral matrices coexist within each nation. Each matrix provides a complete, unified, and emotionally compelling worldview, easily justified by observable evidence and nearly impregnable to attack by arguments from outsiders.”

126) for Haidt growing up, being liberal was cool, it was righteous, seemed so obviously ethical

“Liberals marches for peace, worker’s rights, civil rights, and secularism. The Republican Party was (as we saw it) the party of war, big business, racism, and evangelical christianity.”

“if we could not imagine other moralities, then we could not believe that conservatives were as sincere in their moral beliefs as we were in ours.”

127) the anthropological experience in India at 29 had Haidt confront and understand moralities unlike his

“I had escaped from my prior partisan mind-set (reject first, ask rhetorical questions later) and began to think about liberal and conservative policies as manifestations of deeply conflicting but equally heartfelt visions of the good society.”

128) “we are multiple from the start” - Richard Shweder, 1991

129) “moral pluralism is true *descriptively*. As a simple matter of anthropological fact, the moral domain varies across cultures.”

taste buds of the righteous mind

132) “neither Shweder nor I am saying that “anything goes,” or that all societies or all cuisines are equally good. But we believe that moral monism – the attempt to ground all of morality on a single principle – leads to societies that are unsatisfying to most people and at high risk of becoming inhumane because they ignore so many other moral principles”

133) Mencius, Chinese sage 2,300 years ago: “moral principles please our minds as beef and mutton and pork please our mouths.”

“morality is like a cuisine: it’s a cultural construction, influenced by accidents of environment and history, but it’s not so flexible that anything goes. ... cuisines vary, but they all must please tongues equipped with the same give taste receptors. Moral matrices vary, but they all must please righteous minds equipped with the same six social receptors.”

134) Hume “believed that philosophers who tried to reason their way to moral truth without looking at human nature were no better than theologians who thought they could find moral truth revealed in sacred texts. Both were transcendentalists.”

135) Hume also used the taste analogy: “Morality is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each particular Being; in the same Manner as the Distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions therefore, ought not to be class’d with the Operations of Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.”

“There’s nothing transcendental” about moral taste receptors.

136) attack of the systemizers

138) utilitarianism’s creator, Jeremy Bentham, was a high systemizer, and (according to Philip Lucas and Anna Sheeran)

139) if alive today “he would have received the diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome

“Kant, like Plato, wanted to discover the timeless, changeless form of the Good. He believed that morality had to be the same for all rational creatures.”

140) came to a rule to banish contradiction: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become universal law.”

Bentham used arithmetic, Kant used logic

“I do not want to suggest that utilitarianism and Kantian deontology are incorrect as moral theories just because they were...”

141) ...founded by men who may have had Asperger’s syndrome. That would be an ad hominem argument, a logical error, and a mean thing to say.”

“we want to discover how the moral mind *actually* works, not how it *ought* to work, and that can’t be done by reasoning, math, or logic. It can be done only by observation.”

“Western societies ... became more analytic and less holistic. Utilitarianism and deontology became far more appealing to ethicists than Hume’s messy, pluralist, sentimentalist approach.”

142) anthropologists believe “culture is so powerful that it can cause humans to behave in ways that override whatever ancient instincts we share with other primates”

“Shweder had taught me to be careful about evolutionary explanations, which are sometimes reductionist (because they ignore the shared meanings that are the focus of cultural anthropology) and naively functionalist (because they are too quick to assume that every behavior evolved to serve a function.”

“I had to have a careful evolutionary story for each one”

“I began by analyzing lists of virtues from around the world.”

143) “most cultures have one or more sweet beverages that are widely consumed .... it would be silly to posit the existence of separate receptors for [each different beverage]. there’s one main receptor at work here – the sweetness receptor – and each culture has invented various ways to trigger it.”

“my goal was to find links between virtues and well-established evolutionary theories.” – avoid “just-so” stories” as Rudyard Kipling called them\

144) teamed with Craig Joseph, borrowed idea of modularity from Dan Sperber and Lawrence Hirschfeld.

“modules are like little switches in the brains of all animals. They are switched on by patterns that were important for survival in a particular ecological niche, and when they detect that pattern, they send out a signal that (eventually) changes the animal’s behavior in a way that is (usually) adaptive.”

example of snake detectors, face-recognition

moral taste receptors “would be adaptations to long-standing threats and opportunities in social life. They would draw people’s attention to certain kinds of events ... and trigger instant intuitive reactions, perhaps even specific emotions”

145) original trigger vs current trigger “the original triggers are the set of objects for which the module was designed ... the current triggers are all the things in the world that happen to trigger it.”

a hover fly mimics the appearance of wasps to trigger bird wasp-avoidance module

“the current triggers can change in a single generation”

“even if we all share the same small set of cognitive modules, we can hook actions up to modules in so many ways that we can build conflicting moral matrices on the same small set of foundations”

146) “craig and I tried to identify the best candidates for being the universal cognitive modules upon which cultures construct moral matrices.”

foundations upon which matrices are build – all encompassing worldviews

147) “natural selection would favor those whose cognitive modules helped them to get things right – rapidly and intuitively – compared to those who had to rely upon their general intelligence

149) resuming hume’s project

#### FOUNDATIONS OUTLINED

152) “now we know that traits can be innate without being either hardwired or universal. As the neuroscientist Gary Marcus explains, ‘nature bestows upon the newborn a considerably complex brain, but one that is best seen as *prewired* – flexible and subject to change – rather than *hardwired*, fixed, and immutable’”

153) organized in advance of experience

180) the conservative advantage – fairness/cheating – how to pay for programs with a tax cut

181) care – innocent victims; fairness – money from hardworkers for cheaters, slackers, irresponsible fools; loyalty – patriotism, military values; authority – respect parents, teachers, elders, the police, traditions

186) “shared a deep concern about the polarization and incivility of american political life”

191) standard theories on conservatism “they made it unnecessary for liberals to take conservative ideas seriously because these ideas are caused by bad childhoods or ugly personality traits.”

196) emergence of two types of fairness – not all equality, some proportionality: “people who work hard should get to keep the fruits of their labor. People who are lazy and irresponsible should suffer the consequences.”

are both about reciprocal altruism?

197) “the desire for equality seems to be more closely related to the psychology of liberty and oppression than to the psychology of reciprocity and exchange”

#### (LIBERTY FOUNDATION EXPLAINED)

219) why are we so groupish?

220) “you can understand most of moral psychology by viewing it as a form of enlightened self-interest ... natural selection working at the level of the individual”

221) “we take on group identities and work should to shoulder with strangers toward common goals so enthusiastically that it seems as if our minds were designed for teamwork.”

mental mechanisms both for “promoting our own interests” and “our *group’s* interests, in competition with other groups.

221) group selection - “banished as heresy from scientific circles in the 1970s.”

“new evidence demonstrates the value of thinking about groups as real entities that compete with each other”

222) “Darwin made the case for group selection”

223) “cohesive tribes began to function like individual organisms, competing with other organisms”

“the free rider problem, which is still the main objection raised against group selection”

224) “multi-level selection” “life is a hierarchy of nested levels... genes within chromosomes within cells within individual organisms within hives, societies, and other groups.”

“when groups compete, the cohesive, cooperative group usually wins. But within each group, selfish individuals (free riders) come out ahead. They share in the group’s gains while contributing little to its efforts.”

225) darwin believes it evolves as “social instincts” to not be a loner and killed, reciprocity, reputation management, and sacralizing duties and loyalty

226) “darwin’s response to the free rider problem satisfied readers for nearly a hundred years ... lofty claims were made about animals acting for the good of the species ... in 1966, this loose thinking was brought to a halt.”

227) George Williams 1966 book: “Williams noted that adaptation at a given level always implies a select (design) process operating at that level, and he warned readers not to look to igher levels (such as groups) when selection effects at lower levels (such as individuals) can fully explain a trait.”

228) Dawkins followed up in 1976 with *the Selfish Gene* which was even more reductionist – by the late 1970s “anyone who said that a behavior occurred ‘for the good of the group’ was a fool who could be safely ignored.”

229) “All acts of apparent altruism, cooperation, and even simple fairness had to be explained, ultimately, as covert forms of self-interest”

“Morality, said Williams, is “an accidental capability produced, in its boundless stupidity, by a biological process that is normally opposed to the expression of such a capability.”

individual altruism for strangers is rare, but “groups of people who know each other and share goals and values” have an “ability...

230) ...to work together, divide labor, help each other, and function as a team” doing so “is so all-pervasive that we don’t even notice it.”

“people in every society readily organize themselves into cooperative groups with a clear division of labor ... this ability is an excellent candidate for being a group-relation adaptation.”

231) group selection is still controversial; haidt had four reasons to explain its efficacy

232) eukaryotes evolving from prokaryotes created more of a division of labor; then multi-celled organisms

233) “whenever a way is found to suppress free riding so that individual units can cooperate, work as a team, and divide labor, selection at the lower level becomes less important, selection at the higher level becomes more powerful, and that higher-level selection favors the most cohesive superorganisms”

234) the model of sterile colonies and fertile queens was “discovered independently several dozen ... times” in addition to bee and ant ancestors

235) “one of the key features that has helped all the nonhuman ultrasocials to cross over appears to be the *need to defend a shared nest.*”

Bert Holldobler and EO Wilson: “In all the known [species that] display the earliest stages of eusociality, their behavior protects a *persist, defensible resource* from predators, parasites, or competitors. The resource is *invariable a nest plus dependable food* within foraging range for the nest inhabitants.”

“feed offspring over an extended period”

236) “our ancestors were (1) territorial creatures with a fondness for defensible nests (such as caves) who (2) gave birth to needy offspring that required enormous amounts of care, which had to be given while (3) the group was under threat from neighboring groups.”

the strategy was a success leading to civilization: “we have pushed all other mammals to the margins, to extinction, or to servitude.”

237) Michael Tomasello: “it is inconceivable that you would ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together.”

238) “human cognition veered away from that of other primates when our ancestors developed *shared intentionality.*”

239) mental representations of tasks was shared among people; “when everyone in a group began to share a common understanding of how things were supposed to be done, and then felt a flash of negativity when any individual violated those expectations, the first moral matrix was born.”

even chimps hunting together suggest they are only concerned narrowly with themselves

“a matrix is a *consensual* hallucination”

first we developed shared intentions in small pairings or groups, then it scaled up to

240) “‘group-mindedness’ - the ability to learn and conform to social norms, feel and share group-related emotions, and, ultimately, to create and obey social institutions, including religion.”

“many people assume that language was our Rubicon, but language became possible only *after* our ancestors got shared intentionality. Tomasella notes that a word is not a relationship between a sound and an object. It is an agreement *among people* who share a joint representation of the things in their world”

genes and cultures coevolve

241) “when culture accumulates, it means that people are learning from each other, adding their own innovations, and then passing their ideas on to later generations.”

242) pre-human primates developed tools: “Acheulean tools are nearly identical everywhere, from Africa to Europe to Asia, for more than a million years ... the know of how to make these tools may have become innate.” like with beavers and dams

242) then campsite-making hominids made hearths, spears, hunting, butchered, cooked, shared

“from that point onward, people lived in an environment that was increasingly of their own making.”

“anthropologists Peter Richerson and Rob Boyd have argued that cultural innovations (such as spears, cooking techniques, and religions) evolve in much the same way that biological innovations evolve, and the two streams of evolution are so intertwined that you can’t study one without studying both.”

ex. lactose tolerance

244) “Richerson and Boyd argue that gene-culture coevolution helped to move humanity up from the small-group sociability of other primates to the tribal ultrasociality that is found today in all human societies.”

“humans beings take extraordinary, costly, and sometimes painful steps to make their bodies advertise their group memberships.”

quoted: ‘new social instincts... a psychology which ‘expects’ life to be structured by moral norms and is designed to learn and internalize such norms; new emotions such as shame and guilt”

“conform to the most important collective norms” – “self-domestication”

“our brains, bodies, and behavior show many of the same signs of domestication that are found in our domestic animals: smaller teeth, smaller body, reduced aggression, and greater playfulness, carried on even into adulthood.”

246) “domesticated animals (including humans) are more childlike, sociable, and gentle than their wild ancestors”

“these tribal instincts are a kind of overlap, a set of groupish emotions and mental mechanisms laid down over older and more selfish primate nature.”

“the coevolution of tribal minds and tribal cultures didn’t just prepare us for war; it also prepared us for far more peaceful coexistence within our groups, and, in modern times, for cooperation on a vast scale as well.”

247) evolution can be fast

in 2000 Stephen Jay Gould argued genetic evolution is no longer a factor as culture is faster

genetic evolution can be fast – ex artificial selection

249) geneticist William Muir used group selection on egg-laying hens: “he worked with cages containing twelve hens each, and he simply picked the *cages* that produces the most eggs in each generation. Then he bred *all* of the hens in those cages to produce the next generation. Within just three generations, aggression levels plummeted ... the group-selected hens were more productive than were those subjected to individual-level selection.”

250) “genetic evolution *greatly accelerated* during the last 50, 000 years.” as shown by the Human Genome Project

the speedup of cultural evolution was matched by a speedup of biological evolution

251) haidt doesn’t see new mental modules from scratch in 12, 000 years, but tweaks

253) group selection pulls for cooperation, for the ability to suppress antisocial behavior and spur individuals to act in ways that benefit their groups. Group-serving behaviors sometimes impose a terrible cost to outsiders (as in warfare). But in general, groupishness is focused on improving the welfare of the in-group, not harming the out-group.

The hive switch

256) participation in collective ritual led to ‘a strange sense of personal enlargement’

257) “the process of ‘muscular bonding’ - moving together in time – was a mechanism that evolved long before the beginning of recorded history for shutting down the self and creating a temporary superorganism”

I becomes we “communal effort in battle”

258) “we have the ability to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves.” - the hive switch

259) “the hive switch is an adaptation for making groups more cohesive, and therefore more successful in competition with other groups”



dance with wild abandon around fire, synchronized drums: “Ehrenreich argues, collective and ecstatic dancing is a nearly universal “biotechnology” for binding groups together ... it fosters love, trust, and equality.”

260) europe abandoned these practices with the rise of individualism, the enlightenment, the industrial revolution, WEIRD culture

no precedence for this; “Durkheim insisted that there were ‘social facts’ that were not reducible to facts about individuals.”

261) duality of man – as an individual vs as a collective: “*i am simply a part of the whole, whose actions I follow, and whose influence I am subject to.*”

262) collective effervescence “the passion and ecstasy that group rituals can generate.”

durkheim: “once the individuals are gathered together, a sort of electricity is generated from their closeness and quickly launches them to an extraordinary height of exaltation ... vital energies become hyperexcited, the passions more intense, the sensations more powerful”

pulls us into the world of the sacred from the profane, towards what’s “higher and nobler”

263) other examples of the switch:

awe in nature “all mean egotism vanishes” - Emerson

264) “higher feelings of wonder, admiration, and devotion which fill and elevate the mind” - Darwin

“awe in nature, as mystics and ascetics have known for millenia.”

emotion of awe: triggered by vastness “something overwhelms us and makes us feel small”  
a need for accommodation “our experience is not easily assimilated into our existing mental structures”  
we must change those structures – a kind of reset button

“awe is one the emotions most closely linked to the hive switch, along with collective love and collective joy”

265) hallucinogens are commonly used “given their unique ability to shut down the self and give people experiences they later describe as ‘religious’ and ‘transformative’

266) “peak experiences” of Abe Maslow

“unity, including loss of sense of self, and a feeling of underlying oneness ... transcendence of time and space ... deeply felt...”

267) positive mood ... a sense of sacredness ... a sense of gaining intuitive knowledge that felt deep and authoritatively true ... paradoxicality ... difficulty describing what had happened ... transiency ... persisting positive changes in attitude and behavior”

“genuine mystical elements” “contribution to their spiritual lives” “drawn out into infinity” “vastness of Creation”

raves

“wild abandon and asexuality”

268) “deep connection with everyone who was there as well as the rest of the universe”

269) “single signifying group consciousness” “communalism”

270) “searching for a calling”

the hive switch is not “a spot in the brain” “A clump of neurons” but are “a *functional* system cobbled together from preexisting circuits and substances reused in slightly novel ways to produce a radically novel ability”

oxytocin glues us together “widely used among vertebrates to prepare females for motherhood”

“uterine contractions ... milk let down ... motivation to touch and care for one’s children”

“evolution has often reused oxytocin to forge other kinds of bonds”

“in species in which males stick by their mates or protect their own offspring, it’s because male brains were slightly modified to be more responsive to oxytocin”

271) oxytocin makes you “more trusting... conversely, people who behave trustingly cause oxytocin levels to increase in the partner they trusted.”

level rises when seeing empathetic suffering – shows parochial altruism

“love drug ... cuddle hormone”

parochial altruism

“oxytocin should bond us to our partners and our groups, so that we can more effectively compete with other groups. It should not bond us to humanity in general”

“oxytocin made men more willing to hurt other teams because doing so was the best way to protect their own group”

272) “over and over again the researchers looked for signs that this increased in-group love would be paired with increased out-group hate”

mirror neuron system

1980s italian scientists found “monkeys seemed to *mirror* the actions of others in the same part of its brain that it would use to do those actions itself.”

273) mirror neurons fire “not when they see a specific physical movement but when they see an action that indicates a more general goal or intention.”

for monkeys “mirror neurons seem designed for the monkey’s own *private* use, either to help them learn from others or to help them predict what another monkey will do next.” - a “prerequisite for Tomasello’s shared intentionality”

“in humans the mirror neurons have a much stronger connection to emotion-related areas in the brain ... people feel each other’s pain and joy to a much greater degree than do any other primates.”

“suited for Durkheim’s collective sentiments”

274) mirror neurons responded when ‘nice’ people were harmed not ‘selfish’ people; “some even showed neural evidence of pleasure”

“we are more likely to mirror and then empathize with others when they have conformed to our moral matrix than when they have violated it”

275) transactional leadership “institutionalized carrots and sticks ... to motivate self-serving employees to act in ways the company desires”

transformational leadership “can activate pride, loyalty, and enthusiasm among its employees and then monitor them less closely” more social capital

276) “leadership can only be understood as the complement of followership ... the real puzzle is why people are willing to follow”

“people are happy to follow when they see that their group needs to get something done, and when the person who emerges as the leader doesn’t activate their hypersensitive oppression detectors”

authority, loyalty, and liberty must be activated

277) “the hive switch may be more of a slider switch than an on-off switch”

“make everyone feel like family ... shared values and common identity”

doing the same thing together inspires groupishness – chants, dancing, exercise

278) “synchrony builds trust”

“intergroup competition increases love of the in-group far more than it increases dislike of the out-group” friendly rivalries

279) “the yearning to serve something large than the self has been the basis of so many modern political movements.”

280) “fascism is hive psychology scaled up to grotesque heights.” so is all hive mind quasi-fascist? No

“ecstatic dancing is an evolve biotechnology for *dissolving* hierarchy and bonding people *to each other as a community*.” - festivals invert or erase structures to forge some warmth once they are reintroduced

fascist rallies are “*spectacles*, not festivals. They used awe to *strengthen* hierarchy and to bond people to the *godlike figure of the leader*.”

281) “[hiving] is a normal function ... to bond dozens or at most hundreds of people together into communities of trust, cooperation and even love.”

“the nature of group selection is to suppress selfishness within groups to make them more effective at competing with other groups”

282) “a nation that is full of hive is a nation of happy and satisfied people ... creating a nation of multiple competing groups and parties was, in fact, seen by america’s founding fathers as a way of preventing tyranny”

“a nation of individuals ... is likely to be hungry for meaning.”

283) “happiness comes from betwee. It comes from getting the right relationships between yourself and others, yourself and your work, and yourself and something larger than yourself.”

284) evolution constrains our ability to love unconditionally, and we are more limited to parochial love

“it would be nice to believe that we humans were designed to love everyone unconditionally”

285-287) religion is a team sport – rituals of sports, drinking, chants, synchronized activity, are “*the creation of community*.”

college football as an analogy for religion – bind peoples together- supernatural beliefs aren’t central

“religious rite”

Durkeim on religion: “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”

288) following 9/11 was a serge of criticism of all religion – rise of New Atheism

290) “trying to understand the persistence and passion of religion by studying beliefs about god is like trying to understand the persistence and passion of college football by studying the movements of the ball. you’ve got to broaden your inquiry. you’ve got to look at the ways that religious beliefs work with religious practices to create a religious community.”

believing, belonging, doing

291) New Atheists assume rationality’s dominance; Haidt focuses on automatic processes underlying religious belief and community formation

292) New Atheists argue religious belief is “against the tide of adaptation” which should “eliminate costly and wasteful behaviors from an animal’s repertoire” and formed of “parasitic memes”

they blame hypersensitive agency detection devices – it’s better to get false positives than negatives for survival

compares to face detection module

293) “the hypersensitive agency detection device is finely tuned to maximize survival, not accuracy”

supernatural explanations come emerge “not as an adaptation for anything but as a by-product of a cognitive module that is otherwise highly adaptive”

New Atheists theorize other mental modules are involved – falling in love, gullible submission to authority, mind-body dualism

294) “*at no point* was religion itself beneficial to individuals or groups ... *the genes did not change in response to selection pressures* either for or against religiosity during the 50, 000 years since then”

295) “the selection [of religious memes] occurs not on the basis of the benefits religions confer upon individuals or groups but on the basis of their ability to survive and reproduce themselves.”

“dawkins similarly describes religions as viruses”

296) anthropologists “Atran and Henrich argue that the cultural evolution of religion has been driven largely by competition among groups”

297) religions evolve to create moral community – capricious foragers gods vs. more moralizing agricultural gods

“creating gods who can see everything, and who hate cheaters and oath breakers, turns out to be a good way to reduce cheating and oath breaking.”

“another helpful cultural innovation ... are gods who administer collective punishment ... angry gods make shame more effective as a mean of social control.”

“religions do in fact help groups to cohere, solve free rider problems, and win the competition for group-level survival”

298) “for religious communes, the effect was perfectly linear: the more sacrifice a commune demanded, the longer it lasted.”

299) “rituals, laws, and other constraints work best when they are sacralized”

Roy Rapaport: “to invest social conventions with sanctity is to hide their arbitrariness in a cloak of seeming necessity.”

“*the very ritual practices that the New Atheists dismiss as costly, inefficient, and irrational turn out to be a solution to one of the hardest problems humans face: cooperation without kinship.*”

300) the anthropologists discount rapid evolution but Haidt plans to see if modules have been fine-tuned since agriculture started

301) David Sloan Wilson combined Durkheim's two-tier levels of sense and Darwin group selection looking at how religions formed and their social effects

302) description of Balinese rice adequate structure and religion

303) "Gods (like maypoles) are tools that let people bind themselves together as a community by circling around them"

304-305, 306) even the capricious gods of the !Kung help bond, recapitulates religious functionality again

307-308) are religious people nicer? God good or evil?

"if religion is a group-level adaptation, then it should produce parochial altruism." it does

309) "interaction of God, trust, and trade ... temples often served an important commercial functions ... markets that require very high trust to function efficiently are often dominated by religiously..."

310)... bound ethnic groups"

"is religious altruism a boon or a curse to outsiders?" no religious people appear more generous overall

311) "The only thing that was reliably and powerfully associated with the moral benefits of religion was *how enmeshed people were in relationships with their co-religionists*. it's the friendships and group activities, carried out within a moral matrix that emphasizes selflessness. That's what brings out the best in people"

313) god helps us conform; "sometimes we really do transcend self-interest and devote ourselves to helping others, or our groups"

without religion to provide thick moral matrices we need to take the finding of substitutes seriously – our else we have anomie, normlessness

314) "moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible"

functionalist definition – description, not prescription

316) "i don't know what the best normative ethical theory is for individuals in their private lives."

also "no compelling alternative to utilitarianism"

319) can't we all disagree more constructively?

Polarization worsened in the 90s with bipartisan respect dwindling, into the 00s with worse budgets

322) “preserve the present order, or change it?” right or left – self-interest is a poor predictor

323) “genes contribute, somehow, to just about every aspect of our personalities”

324) “genetics explains between a third and a half of the variability among people on their political attitudes.”

“conservatives react more strongly than liberals to signs of danger, including the threat of germs and contamination, and even low-level threats such as sudden blasts of white noise.”

325) liberals are more open to experience, “the genes (collectively) give some people brains that are more (or less) reactive to threats, and that produce less (or more) pleasure when exposed to novelty, change, and new experiences.”

three levels of personality – Dan McAdams – lowest level “dispositional traits” “they’re more like adjustments to dials on brain systems that everyone has” - OCEAN traits

326) the second level - “characteristic adaptations”

“they are called adaptations because people develop them in response to the specific environments and challenges that they happen to face” - a liberal trait person in a well-ordered school may end up extra rebellious opposed to at a progressive school

328) “life narratives” are the third level “psychologists [should] connect their quantitative data to a more qualitative understanding of the narrative people create to make sense of their lives. These narratives are not necessarily *true* stories – they are simplified and selective reconstructions of the past, often connected to an idealized version of the future.” - saturated with morality

331 – liberal narrative. So accurate. 332 – conservative one

333 – liberals use less foundations – is that true? More individualistic foundations sure

336, 337 – Haidt in 2005 read a book on conservatism, contrasted to orthodoxy; it’s also based on enlightenment values

338, 339 – social capital defined (social ties and productive relationship and norms), to define moral capital

340) conservatives see social capital as insufficient and institutions are necessary to constrain people to better behavior

343) “liberalism is not sufficient as a governing philosophy. It tends to overreach, change too many things too quickly, and reduce the stock of moral capital inadvertently. Conversely, while conservatives do a better job of preserving moral capital, they often fail to notice certain classes of victims, fail to limit the predations of certain powerful interests, and fail to see the need to change or update institutions as times change.”

“yin and yang refer to any pair of contrasting or seemingly opposed forces that are in fact complementary and interdependent. Night and day are not enemies, nor are hot and cold, summer and winter, male and female. We need both, often in a shifting or alternating balance.”

John Stuart Mill: “A part of order and stability, and a party of progress and reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life.”

Bertrand Russel: “philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.”

344) “every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation impossible.”

345-366 – describes the virtues of the left and right and how partisan absolutism is getting worse, the importance of coming up with ways to reverse the worst aspects of self-sorting parties and ideas

**Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2012). Sacred values and evil adversaries: A moral foundations approach. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), *Herzliya series on personality and social psychology. The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (p. 11–31). American Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/13091-001>**

1) Isaiah Berlin: “monism is at the root of every extremism”

“the elevation or ‘sacralization’ of a moral principle or symbol is a major cause of evil.”

2) “gods may have originally emerged as a byproduct of other cognitive capabilities”

“the social psychology of religion should not focus on belief in gods; it should focus on the group-binding and society-constituting effects of ritual practice and other religious behaviors.”

“human behavior now includes a rather strong tendency to invest [stuff] with...

3) ... extraordinary importance that is no way justified by practical or utilitarian considerations”

“the psychology of sacredness may (or may not) have co-evolved with belief in gods, but it is now a very general aspect of human nature.”

“valued beyond whatever utility they possess” - emile durkheim

“sacredness does not require a God.”

Rudolph Otto - “a category completely separate from ordinary life”

4) “sacred values ... traded off for a profane value ... felt tainted and immoral”

“diversity of moral content” - the specific cuisine, structure is the taste buds



5) moral foundations “first proposed by two cultural psychologists”

“reciprocal gift-giving as a means of forging relationships” - Malinowski

“evolutionary discussions of ‘reciprocal altruism’” - Trivers

6) Dan McAdam’s work on narrative

7) “we have found it most useful to move from ‘life stories’ to ‘ideological narratives’”

“ideological narratives ... are clearly like life stories ... incorporate a reconstructed past and imagined future, often telling a story of progress or of decline.”

“each person must be the first author of her own life story.”

“when people join together to pursue political projects .... they must share a *common story*”

“Ideological narratives, then, by their very nature, are always stories about good and evil. They identify heroes and villains.”

“narrative thinking has been called one of two basic forms of human cognition”

8) “successful stories ... fit well with the human mind, particularly by eliciting strong emotions”

“idealistic evil is nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to individuals.”

9) “just as something is seen as worthy of ultimate protection, there is a vision of what it must be protected from: this is a vision of evil”

10) “evil is something special that comes out of a shared narrative. ... Evil is whatever stands in the way of sacredness.”

14) “sacredness: it is all-or-nothing”

18) “we suggested a process whereby strongly held values, in the presence of intergroup conflict or competition, lead to the sacralization of specific people, places, or ideas.”

**Ditto, Peter et al., “Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially Purity) Help Explain Culture War Attitudes.” in *Journal of Research in Personality*, Vol 46 (2012), 184-194.**

192:

“attitudes about global warming were also predicted by Purity, which may reflect a tendency to perceive nature as sacred.”

fairness was the weakest predictor: “in its current form, this foundation fails to capture ideological variation in how fairness is interpreted. It could be that liberals tend to view fairness as equality of outcome, whereas conservatives view it as equality of opportunity.”

**Peter, Ditto et al., “Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism” Nov 28 2012, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184440>**

4: “irreducible basic elements”

“plurality of ideals ... not an infinity of [values.]

“Scientists value parsimony as well as explanatory adequacy. There is, however, an inherent tension between these two values.”

“How many ‘irreducible basic elements are needed to represent, understand, and explain the breadth of the moral domain?”

Lawrence Kohlberg: “Virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture... the name of this ideal form is justice.” 1971 paper

Pluralists like William James sees intellectual resistance to it; it’s messier, muddled, a grab bag; not clean and elegant

5: “We grant right at the start that our particular list of moral foundations is unlikely to survive the empirical challenges of the next several years with no challenges. But we think that our general approach is likely to stand the test of time.” more pluralism “who draw on both cultural and evolutionary psychology”

“our project is descriptive, not prescriptive.”

“morality is derived from or constrained by multiple innate mental systems, each shaped by a different evolutionary process.”

6: “Kohlberg founded the modern field of moral psychology with his declaration that the answer was one.”

“Gillian (1982) argued that the morality of girls and women did not follow Kohlberg’s one true path”  
“Kohlberg, Gillian, an Turiel were all united in their belief that morality is about how *individuals* out to relate to, protect, and respect other individuals.”

7: “Having worked with both Fiske and Shweder, Haidt wanted to integrate the two theories into a united framework for studying morality across cultures.” the models emphasized different aspects of the human experience.”

Haidt wanted to “bridge evolutionary and anthropological approaches to moral judgment.”

Nativism: preparedness

8: “adaptations are often called modules, which evolutionary theorists generally do not view as fully ‘encapsulated’ entities with ‘fixed neural localizations’ but as *functionally specialized mechanisms* which work together to solve recurrent adaptive problems quickly and efficiently.”

“massive modularity hypothesis... the mind is thought to be full of small information-processing mechanisms”

9: as with taste many cuisines can be created with the moral foundations as taste receptors

“moral foundations theory proposes that the human mind is organized in advance of experience so that it is prepared to learn values, norms, and behaviors related to a diverse set of recurrent adaptive social problems.”

10: “but our claim is that the universal (and incomplete) first draft of the moral mind gets filled in and revised so that the child can successfully navigate the moral ‘matrix’ he or she actually experiences.”

“this is why we chose the architectural metaphor of a ‘foundation.’ ... *the foundations are not the finished buildings*, but the foundations constrain the kinds of buildings that can be built most easily.”

*intuitionism:*

11: “Haidt formulated the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) and defined moral intuition as: the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”

“the SIM proposed that moral evaluations generally occur rapidly and automatically, products of relatively effortless, associative, heuristic processing that psychologists now refer to as System 1 Thinking”

“System 2 Thinking ... was often initiated by social requirements to explain, defend and justify our intuitive moral reactions to others.”

“our moral reasoning, like our reasoning about virtually every other aspect of our lives, is motivated.”

“moral intuitions tend to fall into familiars or categories.”

14: “MFT is a nativist, cultural-developmental, intuitionist, and pluralist approach to the study of morality”

16: “we can say that the moral domain in WEIRD cultures is fairly narrow, comparatively speaking.”

“richer people having a narrower moral domain.”

17: three level model of personality – Mc Adams

“Level 1 are *dispositional traits* such as the Big 5. ... At level 2 are ... *characteristic adaptations*, including values, goals, and moral strivings ... characteristic adaptations are ... more conditional and domain-specific than dispositional traits. At level 3 ... are *integrative life stories* - personal narratives that people construct to make sense of their values and beliefs ... many such stories are not fully self-authored, but rather are often ‘borrowed’ from ideological narratives and stereotypes commonly held in culture.”

18: “Lewis and Bates measured the Big Five personality traits, moral foundations, and political ideology and found that higher scores on Care-Fairness were related to greater openness, neuroticism,

and agreeableness, and that higher Loyalty-Authority-Sanctity scores were associated with greater conscientiousness and extraversion, and lower levels of neuroticism.”

23: “unexpectedly, the Sanctity foundation emerged as the strongest predicting foundation for most issues.”

25: Winegard and Deaner (2010) found that participants’ endorsement of moral concerns about group loyalty predicted the extent to which they identified with their favorite sports team.”

“For any theory that claims to be rooted in human nature, the theory must be tested in diverse samples and across different cultures.”

26: “compared to the liberal vs conservative differences in the US, these cross-cultural differences were small – consistent with the theory that variation within cultures exceeds variation between cultures”

29: “We do not expect the anyone will find five distinct and discrete patterns of physiological activity related to the five foundations. Foundations are not spots on the brain, nor are they each identified by one specific physiological signature.”

study on gray-matter volume in brains and MFT scores showed correlations of Care, Fairness, Sanctity, and Authority with different regions that are already known to relate to affective states associated with the foundations

31: “we reject their claim that nativists are obligated to point to specific neural circuits, or to genes for those circuits. Given that nobody can find a set of genes that, collectively, explains 5% of the variance in how *tall* people are (Gudbjartsson et al., 2008), what chance is there that anyone will find a set of genes that code for mental modules whose expressed is far more subject to cultural influence than is height?”

32: Kohlberg’s individualist chauvinism:

“any cross-cultural difference in the ability to reason about justice were explained as developmental differences: children in some cultures did not have as many opportunities for role-taking in egalitarian interactions, but if they did have those opportunities, they’d reach the same endpoint.”

33: critiquing moral intuitionism, Narvaez (2010) “makes the important point that moral ‘expertise,’ like other forms of expertise, often begins with conscious deliberation that gradually becomes automatic.” moral intuitionism focuses on quick reactions and their justifications. “we have focused too much of our attention on the initial moral judgment, and not enough on the processes by which morality develops and improved with experience.” but this needs to be studied further, with some studies listed

34: “but even if one agrees with Harris’s normative views, would the reduction of all morality to harm help us understand how morality actually works? Or would it be ... another attempt to clean up the litter the world actually contains?”

John Jost came up with the liberty and oppression foundation

35: “we think the issue of identifying foundations is rather like the issue of counting planets.”

“the normative objection that calling Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity ‘moral’ could legitimize anything from kinglyism to blind obedience to prejudice and racism.”

“although the word ‘moral’ can introduce ambiguities because it has both descriptive and normative uses, MFT is about the foundations of morality as it is observed around the world, not about the moral systems that ought to prevail.”

“foundations involves both prescriptions (virtues to be admired) and proscriptions (vices to be condemned)

36: “despite the collective coherence suggested by our use of ‘we’ throughout this chapter, we are constantly arguing among ourselves over changes to existing foundations and considerations of new candidate foundations.”

what does it take to be a foundation?

Common critique is it seems arbitrary “based on their reading of five books and articles.”

compare it to finding basic emotions – some appear more essential

37: the foundation is of common concern

“humans began to live in ‘moral matrices,’ - the ‘consensual hallucinations’ that provide a common normative framework against which people can and do judge the actions of others, even when those actions have no direct implications for the self”

moral issues should often be subject to and of gossip

automatic affective evaluations: “if a moral reaction can be elicited quickly and easily, with a variety of [memes about it], that is a point in favor of its foundationhood.

38: culturally widespread: “we should not treat all cultures as equally informative. Hunter-gatherer societies should carry added weight, because they may more closely resemble lifestyles of the ‘environment of evolutionary adaptation.’”

“modern WEIRD societies are arguably the worst places to look for moral foundations because such societies have narrowed the moral domain in order to grant individuals the maximum freedom to pursue their projects.”

39: evidence of innate preparedness: “the case for innateness grows much stronger when a behavior or ability is found in non-human primates and when it can be shown to emerge in young children before they have been exposed to relevant teaching or reinforcement.”

40: evolutionary model demonstrates adaptive advantage

“showing that the feature confers a very strong evolutionary advantage upon groups during intergroup competition while conferring only a small disadvantage upon the individual bearer of the trait”

“MFT was inspired by the obvious match between the major evolutionary theories and the major moral phenomena reported by anthropologists. We engaged in no post-hoc evolutionary theorizing ourselves.”

43: “MFT ... helps researchers as well as the general public look beyond the moral values that are dearest to them, and understand those who live in a different moral matrix”

Isaiah Berlin 2001: “that is why pluralism is not relativism – the multiple values are objective, part of the essence of humanity rather than arbitrary creations of men’s subjective fancies.”

**Haidt, Jonathan and Paul Rozin, “The Domains of Disgust and their Origins: Contrasting Biological and Cultural Evolutionary Accounts,” in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, Vol 17, No 8, Aug 2013, p 367-368.**

367: “they parse disgust into three fundamental domains: pathogen avoidance, sex/mating, and morality”

“disgust figures prominently in Norbet Elias’ account of the ‘civilizing process,’ by which societies develop rules and practices of self-restraint – a ‘second nature’ - that distinguish them from primitive societies and animals.”

“disgust maps to a particular subset of moral concerns ... that involve sanctity, divinity, and the protection of what are perceived to be sacred values and objects.” “violators are seen as ‘polluted’ ... with gods at the top and demons and animals at the bottom. RHM argued that moral disgust is felt when people judge others to have moved downward on that vertical dimension.”

**Blum, Lawrence, “Political Identity and Moral Education: A Response to Jonathan Haidt’s *The Righteous Mind*,” in *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol 42, no 3, 298-316.**

298: “education programs must ... encourage students to recognize some values as more urgent than others”

301: I am suggesting an analogous move on the left – a recognition that there are many liberals of a communitarian stripe, who are substantially concerned with binding value as well as individualistic one, although perhaps not exactly the same binding values as those Haidt puts in that category.”

303: “i would propose that many on the left affirm a more robust understanding of equality of opportunity than do conservatives. Conservatives tend to think equality of opportunity has been achieved if there are no legal or other formal barriers to advancement, although those with greater wealth can buy positional advantages for their children, and this means that those born without wealth are at a competitive disadvantage.”

“but the way fairness is understood in contemporary democratic societies has developed way beyond its role in cooperative enterprises with specific others and in protecting against exploitation.”

306: “it remains true that justice is a good in itself and so is relief of suffering.”

**Frimer, Jeremy, “Do Liberals and Conservatives Use Different Moral Languages? Two Replications and Six Extensions of Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s (2009) Moral Text Analysis,” in *Journal of Research in Personality*, vol 84 (2020) p 1-14.**

1: “language is a primary mechanism by which people learn about and convince others of their beliefs and opinions”

“moral foundations is pluralistic in two ways ... foundations are *psychologically pluralistic* in that each foundation is made up of attitudes, cognitions, values, emotions

2: physiological reactions, and linguistic styles. The theory is also pluralistic in the sense that there is not just one moral foundation ... they are irreducibly pluralistic innate modules.”

“liberals also used loyalty words more frequently than conservatives, a finding not predicted by the MFH.”

6: doing word counts from political speeches was decided against but without corroborating evidence

9: media texts were tested

10: political organization texts were tested

13: “results from the present studies suggest that differences in moral language usage of liberals and conservatives are generally small. ... it would probably be more accurate to conclude that liberals and conservatives use similar moral languages than that they use different languages.”

“liberals and conservatives are similarly obedient to their own authorities and condemn perceived abuses of their ideology’s sacralized objects and heroes. ... liberals and conservatives are made up of the same psychological stuff, but each ideology has its own set of cherished values and symbols. ... psychologically speaking, liberals and conservatives may cut from the same cloth.”

### **Scott, James C, *The Art of Not Being Governed***

216: we have not thought about that because we are wild people

this defiance comes at an economic cost, according to leach.

Ideologies are inherent to a mental existence  
they can be put under the auth+

+ority of others or a burden on ourselves alone  
to forge a worldview more good than evil

to hypothesize some wheat left on the chaff  
some baby still in the bathwater

I try to follow the idea that  
making your ideological biases transparent is best practice  
beliefs and biases, if you can name them

growth requires confronting the unknown and new challenges